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SEEKING A CLEARER PICTURE: ASSESSING
THE APPROPRIATE REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR BROADBAND VIDEO
DISTRIBUTION
Adam B. VanWagner*
This Note examines the appropriate regulatory framework for the
distribution of commercial video content over broadband networks. As
online video providers such as Netflix and Hulu expand, they are beginning
to compete directly with the video services of major cable and
telecommunications companies. Frequently, these companies also serve as
a customer’s Internet service provider, leaving them in the position of
carrying these competitive services over their broadband networks. This
conflict has led to calls for regulation that would protect nascent online
video services from feared anticompetitive actions by the major providers.
In April 2010, against the backdrop of this expanding conflict, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Comcast Corporation v. FCC dealt
a blow to the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) ability to
regulate in this arena. There, the circuit court invalidated the FCC’s
jurisdictional approach to regulating broadband Internet. Although the
FCC has subsequently reasserted its jurisdiction over broadband, the
fallout from Comcast has rekindled debates as to whether broadband is best
governed by proscriptive FCC regulation, or whether oversight of this
marketplace should be left to the general antitrust authorities—the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. This Note
discusses the jurisdictional challenges to broadband oversight faced by
each agency, and assesses the substantive and procedural merits of FCC
and antitrust governance regimes. It then argues that, given the uncertainty
regarding its authority, the FCC should abandon its efforts to regulate
broadband video distribution in the absence of clear market harms.
Finally, this Note proposes that this dynamic and rapidly evolving
marketplace should develop outside the bounds of proscriptive regulations,
with antitrust serving as a backstop if market intervention proves necessary.
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INTRODUCTION
For three weeks in the spring of 2010, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC or Commission) seemed to have a firm regulatory grip
on the future of broadband, a technology that the FCC described as “a
foundation for economic growth, job creation, global competitiveness and a
better way of life.” 1 On March 16, 2010, the FCC submitted to Congress
the National Broadband Plan, a 376-page outline for improving the
American “broadband ecosystem.” 2 Developed pursuant to a 2009
congressional mandate,3 the National Broadband Plan contains proposals
for, among other things, providing universal broadband access to
Americans, decreasing high-speed network costs, and establishing a
broadband public safety infrastructure. 4
The exuberance was short-lived. On April 6, 2010, in Comcast Corp. v.
FCC, 5 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit impugned the FCC’s
regulatory authority over broadband Internet. The court invalidated the
FCC’s use of its ancillary jurisdiction 6 under the Communications Act of
1934 7 (Communications Act) in its effort to prohibit Comcast Corporation
(Comcast) from degrading its broadband customers’ use of peer-to-peer
network applications. 8 Because the FCC had relied solely on this ancillary
jurisdiction to regulate broadband, the Comcast ruling cast doubt upon the
Commission’s authority to oversee provisions of the National Broadband
Plan, as well as the Commission’s ability to enforce its Internet Policy
Statement, a set of network neutrality principles adopted by the
Commission in 2005 that had guided its approach to supervising broadband
1. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND
PLAN, at xi (2010) [hereinafter NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN], available at
http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf.
2. Id.; see also Matt Richtel & Brian Stelter, F.C.C. Questioned on Its Far-Reaching
Plan to Expand Broadband Access, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2010, at B4.
3. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
§ 6001(k)(1)–(2), 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. (123 Stat.) 115, 515–16 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 1305).
4. NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 1, at xi–xv.
5. 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
6. See infra Part II.A.1.
7. Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–614
(2006)) (Communications Act).
8. Comcast, 600 F.3d at 661.
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practices. 9 In response to the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, the FCC began a
process to reassert its authority over broadband, which culminated in a
December 2010 order wherein the Commission, for the first time,
promulgated enforceable rules governing broadband network practice.10
This renewed action quickly came under legal and political attack, and the
Commission’s authority over broadband remains in active dispute.11
While the immediate issue in Comcast concerned the FCC’s ability to
enforce specific network neutrality principles,12 the broader import of the
muddled jurisdictional picture left in the wake of the ruling is highlighted
by the impact that broadband technology has had on a host of industries.13
The film and television industry is among the sectors most affected by
broadband, as widespread adoption of high-speed Internet access has
spawned a marketplace for the distribution of video content via broadband
networks. 14 Increasingly, the formerly discrete media used for delivering
video content—broadcast television, cable, home video, etc.—are
converging toward a system where all distribution occurs over the digital
channels of the Internet. 15 The established business models of the film and
television industry are being fundamentally disrupted by a system that
allows consumers to see their favorite films and television shows online.16
Accordingly, the Internet has become a forum for complex deal making and
strategic positioning among content producers, traditional distributors,
technology giants, and Internet upstarts, as each tries to stake a claim in this
evolving distribution network. 17 Conflicts in this marketplace inhere in the
nature of broadband distribution: the cable and telecommunications
companies that provide broadband access to consumers effectively deliver
to their customers programming for online video distributors that compete
with their traditional video businesses.18

9. See, e.g., Statement, Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, The
Third Way:
A Narrowly Tailored Broadband Framework, 2–4 (May 6, 2010),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-297944A1.pdf; see also infra notes
222–31 and accompanying text. For an explanation of the concept of network neutrality—a
concept revolving around the notion that network operators should not be able to
discriminate against network content, applications, or devices—by one of its leading
proponents,
see
Tim
Wu,
Network
Neutrality
FAQ,
http://www.timwu.org/network_neutrality.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
10. See infra Part II.A.2.
11. See infra notes 273–81 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Amy Schatz, Court Backs Comcast Over FCC, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2010,
at B1; Edward Wyatt, U.S. Court Curbs F.C.C. Authority on Web Traffic, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
7, 2010, at A1.
13. See NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 1, at xi (discussing broadband’s impact
on, among others, the education, health care, and energy sectors).
14. See infra Part I.
15. See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS:
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 155 (paperback ed. 2007).
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. See infra Part I.C–D. See generally Online Television: Hogging the Remote,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 4, 2010, at 67, 70 (discussing tensions between online firms and media
producers in connection with Internet video distribution).
18. See infra Part I.B.2.
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As broadband video options increase, the competitive conflicts endemic
to this marketplace have entered debates over the need for regulatory
oversight of these new distribution channels. 19 Typically, the federal
regulator in this arena would be the FCC, which has long had express
jurisdiction over broadcast television 20 and cable networks. 21 However,
Comcast casts doubt upon this default assumption, including whether the
FCC has the authority to govern the distribution of video content over
broadband networks. 22 Comcast also provides fuel for an ongoing debate
concerning whether broadband competition issues should be overseen by
the FCC, or by the federal antitrust authorities—the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC). 23
This Note assesses the appropriate jurisdictional and substantive
framework for the regulation of video distribution over broadband
networks. Part I outlines the evolving marketplace for the broadband
distribution of video content, and analyzes how online convergence impacts
traditional distribution models in a manner that raises consumer access and
competition policy concerns. In particular, Part I addresses two recent
media transactions: Comcast’s acquisition of a controlling interest in NBC
Universal (NBCU); 24 and a distribution agreement between Netflix, an
online content distributor, and EPIX, a premium television network.25
These agreements, which are representative of the competing interests and
transactional complexities of the broadband media landscape, shed light on
the potential contours of a regulatory regime for this evolving
marketplace. 26
Part II discusses federal oversight of telecommunications and media
industries, and focuses on the jurisdictional challenges that the FCC, the
DOJ, and the FTC face in order to establish their authority over broadband.
Part II begins with a discussion of the FCC’s attempt to regulate broadband
practices, and then turns to the Comcast decision, its aftermath, and the
FCC’s December 2010 broadband rulemaking. Part II also provides an
overview of relevant media oversight by the DOJ and the FTC, specifically
focusing on actions these agencies have taken in connection with the types
of issues that have arisen in the marketplace for broadband video
distribution. Finally, Part II addresses recent actions by the FCC, the DOJ,
and the FTC in the context of media and telecommunications merger
reviews.

19. See infra Part II.A.1.
20. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006) (Title III of the Communications Act).
21. See id. §§ 521–573 (Title VI of the Communications Act).
22. See infra Part II.A.
23. See, e.g., NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at xxiii.
24. See Tim Arango, G.E. Makes It Official: NBC Will Go to Comcast, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 4, 2009, at B3.
25. See Brian Stelter, Netflix to Pay Nearly $1 Billion to Add Films to On-Demand
Service, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2010, at B3.
26. See infra Part I.D.
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Part III outlines various debates relating to the appropriate model for
federal oversight of broadband markets. This part assesses whether
preemptive steps are needed to address the set of conflicts that have arisen
in the broadband video marketplace, and discusses the substantive and
procedural efficacy of relying on either FCC or antitrust oversight of
broadband video distribution.
Part IV argues that the FCC’s continued jurisdictional approach to
broadband regulation is untenable.
While acknowledging potential
jurisdictional and administrative concerns with an antitrust oversight
regime, Part IV concludes that the marketplace for broadband video
distribution is best served by a hands-off, antitrust approach.
I. THE RISE OF BROADBAND VIDEO DISTRIBUTION
The development of an online video distribution market is inextricably
linked to the rapid deployment of broadband Internet service to millions of
American consumers. This part discusses broadband deployment, and
provides an overview of the current marketplace for the distribution of
video content over broadband. 27 In addition, by focusing on two recent
media transactions that involve online distribution—Comcast’s acquisition
of a majority stake in NBCU, 28 and a film distribution agreement between
online distributor Netflix and pay TV channel EPIX 29—this part assesses
the competitive conflicts that have animated calls for federal oversight of
this marketplace.
A. Broadband: An Introduction
Speed matters. The commercial distribution of video content over the
Internet requires a technology that transfers data at a speed sufficient to
mimic the viewing experience of traditional media.30 This technology is
broadband, which, although somewhat nebulously defined, is often linked
to a congressional dictate in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 31 (1996
Act). There, Congress directed the FCC to encourage the adoption of
“advanced telecommunications capability,” which the 1996 Act defined as
“high-speed, switched, broadband telecommunications capability that
enables users to originate and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and
video telecommunications using any technology.” 32 As the technological
27. Because this marketplace is quickly evolving, this part does not purport to be
authoritative, but attempts only to offer a snapshot of the developing broadband video
landscape.
28. See Arango, supra note 24, at B3; see also infra Part I.D.1.
29. See Sam Schechner, Netflix Adds to Web Films, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2010, at B4;
see also infra Part I.D.2.
30. See 1 DANIEL L. BRENNER ET AL., CABLE TELEVISION AND OTHER NONBROADCAST
VIDEO: LAW AND POLICY § 1:24, at 1–43 (Supp. 2010) (noting that the rate of data transfer is
crucial to the online viewing experience).
31. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.) (1996 Act).
32. Id. § 706 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 157 note (1996) (Advanced Telecommunications
Incentives)); see also Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecomms.
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infrastructure of the Internet has evolved, so too has the FCC’s definition of
what speed constitutes “broadband.” 33 Increasingly, the average consumer
broadband service runs at 4.0 megabits per second, the speed necessary for
video to be transmitted successfully over Internet connections in order to
create an enjoyable viewing experience.34
Broadband in the United States is most often serviced via cable modems
or digital subscriber lines (DSL), which run over the existing infrastructure
of the cable and telecommunications industries.35 The largest broadband
providers in the United States are Comcast and AT&T, each with more than
sixteen million subscribers. 36 Among the other major broadband providers
are Verizon Communications (Verizon), with over eight million
subscribers, and Time Warner Cable, with nearly ten million. 37 Over the
past decade, broadband has grown considerably, from a service used by 8
million Americans in 2000 to nearly 200 million in 2009. 38
Broadband video content distribution can be categorized in several
different ways. First, the Internet has spawned a variety of sites that
aggregate user-generated content, of which YouTube is the most
ubiquitous. 39 Second, peer-to-peer networks that rely on the BitTorrent
Capability to All Ams. in a Reasonable & Timely Fashion, & Possible Steps to Accelerate
Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 14 FCC Rcd.
2398, 2406 (1999) [hereinafter First Broadband Deployment Report] (contextualizing the
Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC or Commission) approach to broadband
within the parameters of the 1996 Act).
33. Compare First Broadband Deployment Report, supra note 32, at 2406 (“[W]e define
‘broadband’ as having the capability of supporting . . . a speed . . . in excess of 200 kilobits
per second (kbps) in the last mile.”), with Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced
Telecomms. Capability to All Ams. in a Reasonable & Timely Fashion, & Possible Steps to
Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, as
Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, 25 FCC Rcd. 9556, 9559–60 (2010)
[hereinafter Sixth Broadband Deployment Report] (defining broadband as a connection with
download speeds of at least 4.0 megabits per second (Mbps) and upload speeds of at least 1.0
Mbps).
34. See NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 1, at 21; Sixth Broadband Deployment
Report, supra note 33, at 9559 (indicating that 4.0 Mbps “is the minimum speed required to
stream a high-quality . . . video while leaving sufficient bandwidth for basic web browsing
and e-mail”).
35. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 26.
36. See Press Release, Leichtman Research Grp., Over 800,000 Add Broadband in the
Third Quarter of 2010 (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.leichtmanresearch.com/press/
111510release.html (noting subscriber figures as of September 30, 2010).
37. See id. Time Warner Cable has been a separate corporate entity from Time Warner
since 2009. See Time Warner Cable Spinoff To Finish Next Month, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK
(Feb. 27, 2009, 7:48 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/02/27/time-warner-cable-spinoff-to-finish-next-month/.
38. NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 1, at xi; see also Aaron Smith, Home
Broadband 2010, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, 2 (Aug. 11, 2010),
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/Home Broadband 2010.pdf (stating
that two-thirds of American adults have access to broadband).
39. YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Apr. 20, 2011); see also Press
Release, comScore, comScore Releases September 2010 U.S. Online Video Rankings (Oct.
12, 2010), http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2010/10/comScore_
Releases_September_2010_U.S._Online_Video_Rankings/ (indicating that YouTube is the
most visited video website on the Internet).
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protocol allow broadband users to exchange a variety of data, including
video files. 40 Although these distribution systems are a significant
component of the Internet video landscape, this Note focuses solely on the
regulatory implications for the commercial distribution of professional
content via what the FCC has termed an Online Video Programming
Distributor (OVPD). 41
B. How Broadband Distribution Impacts the Business Models of the Film
and Television Industries
While distinct, the businesses of content production and pay television
are largely linked, and the rise of broadband video distribution has made
their interrelations increasingly complex. For both content creators and
traditional media distributors, digital convergence poses critical challenges
to their traditional operational models in ways that implicate a potential
regulatory scheme for this marketplace.
1. The Collapse of Film Industry Windows
The film industry’s business model is based on marketing and releasing
motion pictures through a series of media-specific steps known as
“windows.” 42 Although patterns may vary depending upon the picture, a
typical film is initially released in theaters, a window that lasts between two
weeks and four months. 43 Home video sales and rentals represent the
second window, which historically has started several months after the end
of the theatrical release44 and, in recent years, has been the biggest revenue
generator for the industry. 45 The home video window now often coincides
with video-on-demand (VOD), a service that allows consumers to access a
program at any time through digital video systems. 46 Approximately one
40. About BitTorrent, BITTORRENT, http://www.bittorrent.com/company/about (last
visited Apr. 20, 2011).
41. The FCC defines an Online Video Programming Distributor (OVPD) as “an entity
which is engaged in the business of making available, either for free or for a charge,
[p]rofessional [v]ideo programming delivered over the Internet to end users, through any
means of online delivery including, but not limited to, a website, an online or mobile
wireless portal, or an aggregator or syndicator of professional online video programming,
such as Apple Company’s iTunes, Comcast’s FanCast XFinity, NetFlix, and Hulu.”
Information and Discovery Request for NBC Universal, Inc., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, 15
(May 21, 2010) [hereinafter NBCU Questionnaire], http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public
/attachmatch/DOC-298335A2.pdf.
42. See 1 THOMAS D. SELZ ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW 3D: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND
BUSINESS PRACTICES § 1:17 (Supp. 2007) (describing the windowing release system); Alexis
Garcia, Comment, Finding the Unobstructed Window for Internet Film Viewing, 9 UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 243, 267 (2002) (same).
43. 1 SELZ ET AL., supra note 42, § 1:17.
44. See id.
45. Id.; see also Shira Ovide, Is Hollywood Going Down With the Blockbuster Ship?,
WALL ST. J. DEAL J. (Sept. 21, 2010, 8:13 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/09/21/ishollywood-going-down-with-the-blockbuster-ship (citing statistics that DVD rentals and
sales accounted for 56% of feature film revenues in 2004, and 44% in 2009).
46. 1 SELZ ET AL., supra note 42, § 1:17; see also SCHUYLER M. MOORE, THE BIZ: THE
BASIC BUSINESS, LEGAL & FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE FILM INDUSTRY 205–11 (3d ed. 2007)
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year following the end of the theatrical release, the pay TV window begins
on premium cable channels such as HBO and Showtime. 47 This eighteenmonth period is followed by non-pay TV distribution through broadcast
networks or channels that are included in standard cable TV packages.48
After this sequence ends, the film may be re-licensed to cable or broadcast
networks. 49 This release system works to maximize profits by ensuring that
the windows do not overlap, which encourages consumers to purchase the
film twice. For example, a consumer may see a movie in theaters and then
buy a DVD several months later. 50
Broadband distribution confounds the windows system, and has resulted
in conflicts between content creators and their traditional distributors.51
Because the convergence of previously compartmentalized media to an alldigital model results in the collapse of discrete distribution windows,52 the
principal challenge for content creators is finding a way to engage in price
discrimination where the technology of distribution no longer naturally
differentiates between the various media associated with the windows
system. 53
As studios recognize that customers purchasing films through broadband
networks no longer embrace a model that forces them to wait for a
particular window, they have begun to tinker with release patterns. For
example, DVD sales, which have been huge revenue generators for the
industry, have typically enjoyed an exclusive window from thirty to fortyfive days prior to the VOD release. 54 As physical DVD sales decline as a
result of the rise of broadband distribution, this exclusive home video
window has been reduced to an average of five days. 55 In addition, studios
are considering releasing pictures via high-priced VOD services during the
theatrical window, a development that would strain their relationship with
theater owners and create further tension between the studios and traditional
home video retailers.56 Thus, as emergent broadband delivery models
(discussing video-on-demand technology and its implications for other distribution
windows).
47. 1 SELZ ET AL., supra note 42, § 1:17.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Garcia, supra note 42, at 267; Lauren A.E. Schuker & Ethan Smith, Hollywood
Eyes Shortcut to TV, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2010, at A1.
51. See generally Seth Gilbert, Cracking Release Windows: Apple, WB Shift the Movie
Industry, METUE (May 1, 2008), http://metue.com/05-01-2008/itunes-warner-brothersstudios-dvd-day-and-date-releases (discussing rising tensions in the industry as film studios
embrace new technologies that disrupt traditional distribution windows).
52. See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 42, at 244; Julia Boorstin, Warner Brothers Starts To
Collapse Media Distribution Windows, CNBC (Sept. 30, 2009, 12:40 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/33091887/Warner_Brothers_Starts_to_Collapse_Movie_Distributio
n_Windows (describing a film studio’s decision to release films via video-on-demand prior
to the home video window).
53. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 24–25.
54. Nat Worden, Studios Seek Out Backup to DVDs, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2010, at B6.
55. See id. (noting that home video sales have been declining since 2007).
56. See Brooks Barnes, In This War, Movie Studios Are Siding With Your Couch, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2010, at B1; Schuker & Smith, supra note 50.
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further disrupt the windows system, film studios are increasingly
confronted with a dilemma of embracing new avenues to reach consumers
that will damage their relationships with their customary distributors.
2. The Threat to Pay Television
The FCC defines the distributors of cable television services—cable
operators, satellite broadcasters, and telecommunications companies—as
multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs).57 MVPDs operate
under a dual revenue model supported by both monthly subscriber fees and
advertising. 58 The MVPDs dominate the television marketplace, with
approximately ninety-seven percent of American households owning
televisions subscribing to an MVPD. 59 The fees for these bundled packages
have risen steadily, reaching an average of $64.00 per month in 2009
compared to the 2004 average of $47.50. 60 Subscription fees for MVPD
service add up to approximately sixty billion dollars per year, 61 while
yearly advertising revenue now totals almost twenty-five billion dollars.62
Because MVPD service is often provided over the same physical
infrastructure as broadband, the top MVPDs coincide with the market
leaders in the broadband industry: Comcast again leads with almost
twenty-three million customers, followed by DirectTV, Dish Network, and
Time Warner Cable. 63
As with the film industry, broadband distribution upsets the traditional
MVPD model. The advent of broadband systems that allow consumers to
purchase a single television episode has led to concerns that consumers will
“cut the cord” and cancel their monthly cable subscriptions in favor of a la
carte online viewing. 64 This problem has become more visible because for
two straight quarters in 2010, the MVPD industry suffered its first ever
declines in overall subscribership.65 Although other factors, such as a weak
57. See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Mkt. for the Delivery of
Video Programming, 24 FCC Rcd. 542, 544 (2009) (13th ann. rep.).
58. See Tim Arango, Cable TV’s Big Goal: Web Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 24, 2009, at
B1; Jeff Bewkes, Opinion, The Coming Golden Age of Television, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2010,
at A21.
59. See Martin Peers, I’m OK, You’re Not OK, Say Television Executives, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 27, 2010, at C10.
60. See Douglas Quenqua, Can a Mouse Cut the Cable?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2010, at
D1.
61. See Brad Stone & Brian Stelter, Web TV, for Subscribers Only, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
2009, at B1.
62. See Cable Advertising Revenue 1999–2009, NAT’L CABLE & TELECOMMS. ASS’N,
http://www.ncta.com/Stats/AdvertisingRevenue.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
63. See Top 25 Multichannel Video Programming Distributors as of Sept. 2010, NAT’L
CABLE & TELECOMMS. ASS’N, http://www.ncta.com/Stats/TopMSOs.aspx (last visited Apr.
20, 2011).
64. See Aaron Rutkoff, Tuning Out Cable, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2010, at A28 (defining
cord-cutting as dropping a “cable subscription for entertainment delivered over the
Internet”).
65. See Amer Barghouth, US Subscription TV Posts Another Quarterly Subscriber Loss,
SCREEN DIGEST (Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.screendigest.com/news/us-subscription-tvposts-another-quarterly-subscriber-loss/view.html.
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economy, may have been significant contributors to these declines, there are
indications that cord-cutting is contributing to the loss of subscribers. 66 As
the threat of cord-cutting rises, and as content providers put more of their
programs online, “the alternative of Web-based distribution, and additional
ad revenues for programmers, raises a conflict with the desires of cable
operators, who want programmers to provide TV episodes to their [VOD]
service.” 67
To be sure, even as they respond to the growth of broadband distribution
by placing more content online, content providers have a significant stake
in the MVPD model; according to one estimate, the content companies
earned thirty billion dollars in 2010 from their share of the revenue from
monthly cable bills. 68 To further complicate the dynamic, MVPDs are
often a customer’s broadband provider as well, which means that customers
who cut the cord are likely using the broadband Internet service provided by
their MVPD to go “over the top” of the MVPD’s own video services.69
This conflict between MVPDs, content providers, and consumers is at the
center of concerns that MVPDs might engage in anticompetitive practices
against broadband video services in order to protect their core video
business. 70
C. The Marketplace for Broadband Video Content
As the number of consumers connected to broadband increases, 71 a
variety of services has developed to deliver commercial video over
broadband networks. This section outlines the major participants in this
marketplace, and discusses how their emergence has generated conflicts
with content producers and MVPDs. This section also discusses the market
for set-top boxes, hardware devices that allow broadband video to be
viewed directly on television sets, as well as the pay television industry’s
response to online distribution.

66. See Brian Stelter, Cord Cutting? Cable Subscriptions Drop Again, N.Y. TIMES
MEDIA DECODER (Nov. 17, 2010, 2:29 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/
11/17/cord-cutting-cable-subscriptions-drop-again (quoting a cable industry analyst as
saying that it is “becoming increasingly difficult to dismiss the impact of over-the-top
substitution on video subscriber performance”). But see Ryan Nakashima, Cable Companies
Strike Back at Cord-Cutting Idea, USA TODAY (Feb. 17, 2011, 10:18 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2011-02-17-cable-losses_N.htm (noting that the MVPD
industry gained between 200,000 and 250,000 subscribers in the fourth quarter of 2010, and
quoting an industry analyst as stating that “[t]he notion that people are disconnecting their
pay TV connections in favor of Netflix has always been a good story but there’s been very
little evidence that it’s actually happening in any material numbers”).
67. 1 BRENNER ET AL., supra note 30, § 1:24.
68. See Sam Schechner & Geoffrey A. Fowler, Amazon Grabs the TV Remote, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 1, 2010, at B1.
69. See supra notes 36–37, 63 and accompanying text.
70. See Schatz, supra note 12.
71. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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1. The Streamers
a. Netflix
Netflix, a company launched in 1999 as an Internet-based DVD rental
service, 72 is seen by some as the primary threat to the traditional film and
television distribution models.73 In its early years, Netflix fended off
challenges from home video leaders Blockbuster and Walmart, both of
company
which attempted to establish web-based rental services. 74 The
entered the broadband distribution market in 2007 with Watch Instantly, a
service that initially allowed subscribers to Netflix’s DVD rental service to
stream video content over computers, mobile phones, or televisions
connected to a Netflix-enabled device. 75 In November 2010, Netflix
announced a streaming-only subscription service for $7.99 per month.76
Netflix has experienced significant growth since it launched Watch
Instantly, boasting over twenty million subscribers at the end of 2010. 77 As
CEO Reed Hastings stated, “This growth is clearly driven by the strength of
our streaming offering. In fact, by every measure, we are now primarily a
streaming company that also offers DVD-by-mail.” 78 The impact of Watch
Instantly suggests that Netflix could become a replacement for traditional
pay TV services, although Netflix maintains that it is merely a
complementary service that will not lead to cord-cutting. 79
Netflix’s streaming service has had a dramatic effect on the broadband
landscape. According to one study, during peak hours, Watch Instantly
accounts for one-fifth of the broadband traffic in the United States.80 The
increasing strength of the company manifested itself in November 2010,

72. See Saul Hansell, Wal-Mart Ends Online Video Rentals and Promotes Netflix, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2005, at C3.
73. See, e.g., ECONOMIST, supra note 17, at 70; Nat Worden, Netflix Gains as Online
Video
Wins
Fans,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Feb.
14,
2011,
5:38
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703584804576144371093782778.html
(describing Netflix as a “disruptive force in the TV and film industry”).
74. See Hansell, supra note 72.
75. See Miguel Helft, The Shifting Business of Renting Movies, by the Disc or the Click,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2007, at C1; Press Release, Netflix, Netflix Offers Subscribers the
Option of Instantly Watching Movies on Their PCs (Jan. 16, 2007),
http://netflix.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=201.
76. Press Release, Netflix, Netflix Launches U.S. Subscription Plan for Streaming
Movies & TV Shows Over the Internet for $7.99 a Month (Nov. 22, 2010),
http://netflix.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=376.
77. See Press Release, Netflix, Netflix Releases Fourth-Quarter 2010 Financial Results
(Jan. 26, 2011), http://netflix.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=383; see also Nick
Wingfield, Netflix Sees Surge in Subscribers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2011, at B9 (noting that
Netflix added 7.7 million subscribers in 2010).
78. Press Release, Netflix, Netflix Announces Q3 2010 Financial Results (Oct. 20,
2010), http://netflix.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=373.
79. See Schechner, supra note 29.
80. See
Fall
2010
Global
Internet
Phenomena,
SANDVINE,
http://www.sandvine.com/news/global_broadband_trends.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
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when Level 3 Communications (Level 3), an Internet backbone provider81
that handles data transport service for Watch Instantly, complained publicly
that Comcast had demanded a recurring fee from Level 3 in order to
transport data over Comcast’s broadband networks.82 Level 3 intimated
that Comcast imposed the fee in an effort to hinder Netflix’s ability to
compete with Comcast’s MVPD business, but Comcast claimed that the fee
was imposed only because of the dramatic increase in Level 3 traffic being
carried over Comcast’s network. 83 Regardless of the motivation, the
episode highlighted a core concern of those pressing for federal intervention
into this developing marketplace: that an MVPD/broadband provider such
as Comcast would be incentivized and able to disrupt the flow of
competitive broadband video services over its networks. 84
b. Hulu
Launched in March 2008, Hulu is the most prominent online broadband
distributor of broadcast television programming. 85 Hulu is a joint venture
among NBCU, News Corporation, and The Walt Disney Company, 86 the
parent companies of broadcast networks NBC, Fox, and ABC,
respectively. 87 The site distributes programming from the three networks,
as well as a host of other content producers.88 Created in part as a response
to the rise of content aggregators such as YouTube, 89 Hulu’s free, ad-based
model allows users to stream a limited number of recently aired television
episodes. 90 In 2010, under pressure to increase revenue, the company
launched Hulu Plus, a subscription service that provides users with access
to full seasons of current television shows, 91 at a cost of $7.99 per month. 92
81. Internet backbone providers are companies that supply the data transport services
necessary to connect regional networks to one another. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra
note 15, at 131-34.
82. See Brian Stelter, Netflix Partner Says Comcast “Toll” Threatens Online Video
Delivery, N.Y. TIMES MEDIA DECODER (Nov. 29, 2010, 9:45 PM),
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/netflix-partner-says-comcast-tollthreatens-online-video-delivery.
83. See id.; see also Daniel Golding, The Real Story Behind the Comcast-Level 3 Battle,
GIGAOM (Dec. 1, 2010, 1:07 PM), http://gigaom.com/2010/12/01/comcast-level-3-battle.
84. See Stelter, supra note 82.
85. See Chuck Salter, The Unlikely Mogul, FAST COMPANY, Nov. 2009, at 98, 100; Jason
Kilar, Welcome to Hulu, HULU BLOG (Mar. 12, 2008), http://blog.hulu.com/
2008/03/12/welcome-to-hulu (the author is the current CEO of Hulu).
86. About, HULU, http://www.hulu.com/about (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
87. Of the major broadcast networks, only CBS does not have a presence on Hulu. See
Brad Stone & Brian Stelter, ABC To Add Its Shows to Videos on Hulu, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
2009, at B7.
88. Content, HULU, http://www.hulu.com/partners (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
89. See 1 BRENNER ET AL., supra note 30, § 1:24 & n.5; see also Salter, supra note 85, at
103 (discussing the creation of Hulu as, in part, a reaction to the posting of broadcast
network content on YouTube).
90. See Brian Stelter, Hulu Offers a $9.99 Subscription to Full Season of Current TV
Shows, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2010, at B4.
91. Id.
92. See Jason Kilar, Hulu Plus Launches Out of Preview for $7.99/month, HULU BLOG
(Nov. 17, 2010), http://blog.hulu.com/2010/11/17/hulu-plus-launches-out-of-preview-for-7-
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Hulu has been a focal point of tension between consumers, content
creators, and MVPDs. In a recent example, Fox pulled its shows from Hulu
in the New York City area during a fall 2010 battle over redistribution fees
with Cablevision, a MVPD. 93 During the dispute, Fox programming was
not available to Cablevision’s MVPD customers, but many of those
customers still had access to Fox programs via Hulu and Fox.com.94
Accordingly, Fox removed the content from Hulu in an apparent attempt to
gain leverage in the ongoing negotiations.95 After viewer outcry, Fox
restored its content on Hulu, but the action nevertheless highlighted the
growing tension that Internet-based distribution imposes on the relationship
between MVPDs and content providers. 96
2. From Brick and Mortar to Ones and Zeros
The broadband distribution of video content has raised concerns for the
companies who have dominated the marketplace for physical home video
sales: retailers such as Walmart, Target, and Best Buy. 97 As DVD sales
slip, these chains have reduced their in-store sales, and have looked for
digital options as replacements.98 After losing an earlier battle with Netflix
for web-based DVD rentals, 99 Walmart re-entered the broadband market
with its February 2010 purchase of Vudu, a streaming video service that
offers new release movie rentals and sales over broadband-connected
devices. 100 Best Buy made its broadband push in November 2009 by
entering into an agreement with CinemaNow, a streaming service that
allows customers to purchase films and television shows on the same day
they are released in the home video window, and also offers streaming
movie rentals. 101

99month; Todd Spangler, Hulu Chops Premium Plan to $7.99, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Nov.
17, 2010, 8:09 AM), http://www.multichannel.com/article/459992-Hulu_Chops_Premium_
Plan_to_7_99.php.
93. See Brian Stelter, In Brief Blackout, Web Becomes a Weapon in Fox-Cablevision
War, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2010, at B3.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Miguel Bustillo, Wal-Mart to Resume Online Movie Sales, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23,
2010, at B2; Sarah McBride & Merissa Marr, Target, a Big DVD Seller, Warns Studios over
Download Pricing, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2006, at A1.
98. See Bustillo, supra note 97.
99. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
100. See Bustillo, supra note 97.
101. See Ben Fritz, Best Buy Launching Digital Movie Service with CinemaNow, L.A.
TIMES COMPANY TOWN (Nov. 2, 2009, 9:00 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
entertainmentnewsbuzz/2009/11/best-buy-launching-digital-movie-service-withcinemanow.html; Richard Lawler, Best Buy’s Internet Movie Store Launches This Month
Under the CinemaNow Brand, ENGADGET (May 18, 2010, 8:17 AM),
http://www.engadget.com/2010/05/18/best-buys-internet-movie-store-launches-this-monthunder-the-ci.
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3. The Digital Giants
Both Amazon.com and Apple have entered the market for broadband
video distribution over the past several years. In 2008, Amazon launched a
web-based streaming service called Amazon Video on Demand that sells
and rents feature films and television episodes. 102 Consumers do not need
to download files in order to make a purchase through Amazon Video on
Demand; the system provides online storage for titles and allows customers
to access these at any time, from any device.103 In February 2011, Amazon
announced that it was adding a complimentary video streaming service to
Amazon Prime, the company’s premium package shipment service, which
costs $79.00 per year. 104 The move is seen as directly targeting Netflix as
the two jockey for leadership in the online streaming market. 105 Apple’s
digital distribution of video content also began in 2008 through its iTunes
marketplace, which requires customers to purchase and download
individual films and television episodes prior to viewing on computers or
mobile devices.106 Like Amazon, Apple’s service offers both sales and
rentals of films and television shows. 107 Apple is currently the market
leader for on-demand broadband video distribution, handling approximately
fifty-seven percent of video transactions and fifty-three percent of online
television show purchases, far outstripping Amazon’s five percent and six
percent share in these respective markets.108
4. Set-Top Boxes and the Battle for the Living Room
The distribution channels discussed above offer consumers an array of
options to replace the bundles of programming sold by MVPDs with free,
inexpensive, or a la carte broadband viewing. For an average consumer to
duplicate the traditional home video and television experience, however,
cord-cutting requires accessing disparate online services and signing up for
multiple subscription contracts, all while experiencing these programs on a
computer screen or mobile device.109 These factors suggest that, on their
own, the evolving broadband distribution models are unlikely to compete

102. See Brad Stone, Amazon Plans an Online Store for Movies and TV Shows, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 2008, at C8.
103. See id.
104. Jacqui Cheng, Amazon Takes on Netflix with Movie Streaming Service for Prime,
ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 22, 2011, 9:37 AM), http://arstechnica.com/media/news/2011/02/
amazon-takes-on-netflix-with-movie-streaming-service-for-prime.ars.
105. Id.
106. Saul Hansell, ITunes Movies: A Tuna Sandwich, N.Y. TIMES BITS (Jan. 15, 2008,
2:09 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/15/itunes-movies-a-tuna-sandwich; see also
What’s on iTunes?, ITUNES, http://www.apple.com/itunes/whats-on (last visited Apr. 20,
2011).
107. See Yukari Iwatani Kane & Shira Ovide, Apple Tries Again at TV, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 2, 2010, at B1.
108. See Geoffrey A. Fowler & Sam Schechner, A New Digital Battlefield, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 3, 2010, at B1.
109. See, e.g., supra notes 76, 92 and accompanying text.
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with a bundled MVPD service that can be accessed with a remote control
from the comfort of one’s living room sofa. 110
That analysis changes with a set-top box, a hardware device that allows
broadband video services to be viewed through a television.111 Many of the
broadband video services discussed above have made agreements with
these manufacturers so that consumers will be able to access the service
through a television interface, 112 access that is often featured prominently
on the websites of OVPDs. 113
Set-top boxes exist in a number of forms. Several companies sell a
dedicated external device that connects Internet-based media services to a
television, of which AppleTV, 114 Roku 115 and Boxee 116 are the most
prominent. In addition, electronics manufacturers are beginning to build
broadband video connectivity into products such as televisions, Blu-ray
players, and gaming consoles. 117 As an indication of the importance of this
functionality, Best Buy’s agreement with CinemaNow 118 allows the retailer
to market the video streaming service in connection with electronics
equipment sales. 119
In the fall of 2010, Google launched its iteration of a set-top box, a video
searching system called Google TV that is currently integrated into three
products: a television and Blu-ray player from Sony and a set-top box from
Logitech. 120 Through a television interface, Google TV allows users to
search for video content from the Internet, MVPD services, and local
storage devices, such as DVRs. 121 Google has received support from a
number of cable networks, including Time Warner—owner of HBO, TNT,
TBS and CNN—to optimize their web portals for viewing through Google
TV-enabled televisions. 122 However, Google TV cannot access all Internet
video programming, as broadcast networks ABC, CBS, and NBC

110. See Quenqua, supra note 60.
111. See generally Kelli B. Grant, Apple TV: The Latest of Many Viewing Options, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB128363245566734521.html.
112. See id.; see also 1 RICHARD RAYSMAN ET AL., EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
LAW: FORMS AND ANALYSIS § 1.03[4][e], at 1-32–32.1 (Supp. 2010).
113. See, e.g., Hulu Plus:
Devices, HULU, http://www.hulu.com/plus?src=
masthead#devices (last visited Apr. 20, 2011); Netflix Ready Devices, NETFLIX,
http://www.netflix.com/NetflixReadyDevices (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
114. See Kane & Ovide, supra note 107.
115. ROKU, http://www.roku.com (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
116. BOXEE, http://www.boxee.tv (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
117. See Grant, supra note 111.
118. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
119. Direct to Your Living Room, CINEMANOW, http://www.cinemanow.com/
Devices.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
120. Get It – Google TV, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/tv/getit.html (last visited Apr.
20, 2011).
121. See Verne G. Kopytoff, Sony Unveils the First Google TV, N.Y. TIMES BITS (Oct.
12, 2010, 8:33 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/12/sony-unveils-the-first-googletv.
122. See Todd Spangler, Google TV Tunes to Turner, HBO, CNBC, Netflix and Others,
MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Oct. 4, 2010, 1:00 PM), http://www.multichannel.com/article/
458030-Google_TV_Tunes_To_Turner_HBO_CNBC_Netflix_And_Others.php.
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specifically have blocked Google TV’s software from accessing video
content on their websites, as has Hulu. 123
Hulu is indicative of the conflicts that arise when broadband video
content is merged with the traditional television experience through a settop box. The broadcast networks that own Hulu exert control over how
Hulu uses their content, and have not allowed set-top boxes to connect to
Hulu’s free, ad-supported content. 124 The problem for the networks is that,
if consumers can use a set-top box to access a free, high-quality stream
through Hulu’s website and watch it on a television, the networks’ ability to
charge heightened pricing for retransmission fees from cable services might
be jeopardized. 125 However, Hulu Plus is accessible through several set-top
boxes, likely because the subscription model allows the networks to offset
any proceeds they might lose from MVPDs. 126
5. The MVPDs Respond: TV Everywhere
The advance of broadband delivery of video programming has triggered a
dynamic response from cable networks and MVPDs, driven by their
concerns over cord-cutting. 127 That response is TV Everywhere, a service
that provides online access to MVPD programming, but only to customers
who purchase standard bundled cable service packages from an MVPD.128
TV Everywhere service includes access to online MVPD content from any
broadband-connected device, such as computers, tablets, and mobile
phones. 129 Time Warner CEO Jeff Bewkes and Comcast CEO Brian
Roberts were the principal developers of TV Everywhere. 130 Bewkes,
whose company produces a significant amount of cable content through its
ownership of TNT, TBS, CNN and other networks, has promoted TV
Everywhere as a means of competing directly for the broadband space by
enhancing the experience of traditional cable television users.131 Others
have expressed a more cynical view, arguing that TV Everywhere is an
attempt to force the outmoded business model of the MVPDs onto the
developing system of online distribution. 132
123. See Sam Schechner & Amir Efrati, Networks, Google Spar Over Web TV, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 22, 2010, at B1.
124. See, e.g., Marvin Ammori, Copyright’s Latest Communications Policy: ContentLock-Out and Compulsory Licensing for Internet Television, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
375, 375–76 (2010) (describing that pressure from Hulu’s content partners resulted in Hulu
blocking its content from Boxee, the set-top box service); Jason Kilar, Doing Hard Things,
HULU BLOG (Feb. 18, 2009), http://blog.hulu.com/2009/02/18/doing-hard-things.
125. See Ammori, supra note 124, at 376–77.
126. See Schechner & Fowler, supra note 68.
127. See generally Stone & Stelter, supra note 61.
128. See Ronald Grover et al., Revenge of the Cable Guys, BUS. WK., Mar. 22 & 29,
2010, at 38, 40.
129. See David Carr, Faith in Its Shows, on Any Medium, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2010, at
B1.
130. See Grover et al., supra note 128, at 40.
131. See id. at 40–44.
132. See, e.g., Karl Bode, Will Cable’s “TV Everywhere” Be a Big Pile of Fail?,
BROADBAND DSL REPORTS (Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/107516.
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Comcast officially launched its version of TV Everywhere, Xfinity TV,
in October 2010. 133 According to Comcast, Xfinity TV contains video
from ninety content providers, including 25,000 TV episodes and 30,000
movies. 134 The service also offers rental of TV shows and movies through
a VOD section. 135 Although the bulk of the content on Xfinity TV is
accessible only to Comcast cable service subscribers, the site contains a
significant amount of free content, much of which Hulu supplies to the
Xfinity portal. 136
As sites such as Xfinity TV roll out to consumers, the backers of TV
Everywhere acknowledge that the service is an attempt to preserve the
MVPD’s dual revenue stream as television moves into the broadband
age. 137 Public interest groups have requested that the DOJ and the FTC
inquire into whether TV Everywhere violates antitrust laws, suggesting that
the MVPDs have colluded to divide up the online video marketplace among
the incumbent MVPDs, and that TV Everywhere will operate to end
competition from upstart broadband distributors. 138 Regardless of the
merits of these allegations, the development of TV Everywhere suggests
that stakeholders in the MVPD business have acknowledged the rise of
broadband distribution and intend to fight for this new distribution space.139
D. Two Representative Agreements
Companies with stakes in the future of video distribution have recently
made collaborative agreements that highlight the increasing importance of
broadband distribution, as well as the growing tensions between broadband
and traditional distribution models. This section outlines two of these
recent agreements and their implications for broadband video.
1. Comcast/NBC Universal
In December 2009, Comcast reached an agreement to acquire fifty-one
percent of NBCU, the media conglomerate that General Electric and
Vivendi had jointly controlled. 140 The agreement was consummated in
January 2011 following an FCC and DOJ merger review process that lasted
over a year. 141 For $13.75 billion, Comcast gained control of the NBC
133. See Todd Spangler, Comcast Opens Xfinity TV Online to All Video Subs,
MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Oct. 25, 2010, 5:28 PM), http://www.multichannel.com/article/
458973-Comcast_Opens_Xfinity_TV_Online_To_All_ Video_Subs.php.
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Bewkes, supra note 58.
138. See Cecilia Kang, Public Interest Groups Call for Antitrust Probe of TV Everywhere,
WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2010, at A9.
139. See Bewkes, supra note 58.
140. See Arango, supra note 24.
141. See Brian Stelter & Tim Arango, Comcast-NBC Deal Wins Federal Approval, N.Y.
TIMES MEDIA DECODER (Jan. 18, 2011, 2:03 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/
2011/01/18/f-c-c-approves-comcast-nbc-deal. For a discussion on dual merger review by the
FCC and the antitrust authorities, see infra Part II.C.
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broadcast network, several NBC-owned local broadcasters, multiple cable
television networks, and the Universal movie studio. 142
The acquisition of NBCU provides Comcast with the type of content that
it can potentially use to leverage its TV Everywhere service against
unaffiliated online distributors.143 As a result, the FCC and DOJ reviews
focused, in particular, on the rise of broadband video distribution, and the
impact that the merged entity would have on this developing
marketplace.144 The FCC, for example, inquired into allegations that
Comcast would withhold NBCU content from online distributors in order to
preserve its dominant position in the MVPD business. 145 In a May 2010
questionnaire, the FCC asked Comcast to “[d]escribe in detail all
discussions, deliberations, analyses, and decisions related to providing or
not providing [NBCU] [v]ideo [p]rogramming to unaffiliated Online Video
Programming Distributors, including but not limited to Boxee, YouTube,
Amazon, and iTunes.” 146 During the review process, the DOJ made similar
inquiries with respect to the merged entity’s ability to hold exclusive sway
over online content.147 In response, Comcast argued that the reviewing
agencies should not impose rules regarding the “rapidly evolving” online
video market. 148
In approving the merger, both the FCC and DOJ imposed a significant
number of conditions that concerned broadband video distribution.149 For
example, the FCC restricted Comcast’s ability to withhold NBCU content
from online competitors and barred Comcast from degrading or blocking
the flow of competitive video content over its broadband networks. 150 For
its part, the DOJ forced Comcast to divest itself of managerial oversight of
Hulu. 151 In addition, the DOJ barred Comcast from requiring content
providers to agree to license terms that would limit broadband distributors’
access to video content. 152 The combined effect of these conditions
constitutes an attempt by the reviewing agencies to provide online

142. See Arango, supra note 24.
143. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Martin Peers, Comcast Could Suffer From Universal Access, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 30, 2010, at C12; Joe Flint, FCC is Digging Deep as It Reviews Comcast-NBC
Universal Deal, L.A. TIMES COMPANY TOWN (May 25, 2010, 3:46 PM),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/entertainmentnewsbuzz/2010/05/fcc-is-digging-deep-as-itsreviews-comcast-nbc-universal-deal.html.
145. See Flint, supra note 144.
146. NBCU Questionnaire, supra note 41, at 7.
147. See Amy Schatz et al., Comcast NBC Deal Review Quickens, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15,
2010, at B11.
148. See id.
149. Stelter & Arango, supra note 141.
150. News, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Grants Approval of Comcast-NBCU
Transaction, (Jan. 18, 2011), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC304134A1.pdf; see also Stelter & Arango, supra note 141.
151. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Allows Comcast-NBCU
Joint Venture To Proceed with Conditions (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2011/January/11-at-061.html.
152. Id.
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distributors with a strong foundation upon which to compete against
incumbent MVPDs. 153
2. Netflix/EPIX
Netflix’s Watch Instantly streaming video collection was primarily
comprised of older films for the first few years of its existence.154
Streaming rights to newer, more popular titles typically were locked up in
agreements with premium cable channels like HBO and Showtime. 155 That
changed in August 2010, when Netflix entered into an exclusive five-year
streaming agreement with EPIX, a premium TV channel that controls rights
to movies from Paramount, Lionsgate, and MGM. 156 The agreement
provides Netflix with access to 1500 titles from the studios, and could
potentially cost Netflix up to one billion dollars in licensing fees.157
Pursuant to the agreement, the films will be available on Netflix following a
ninety-day period of exclusivity on EPIX’s pay TV channel. 158 The
agreement complements an extant 2008 deal between Netflix and the pay
TV channel Starz, which gives Netflix streaming rights to content from
Sony and Disney, rights that Starz controls through its pay TV license with
the film studios. 159 The magnitude of the EPIX deal further demonstrates
that Netflix has staked its future on online streaming and is moving away
from its core business of mailing DVDs to customers. 160
For a number of reasons, the Netflix-EPIX deal presages rising tensions
between broadband distributors, content providers, and MVPDs. First, the
deal suggests the increasing value of delivering content over broadband.161
The Starz deal that Netflix signed in 2008 costs Netflix $30 million per
year; the EPIX deal carries an anticipated $200 million annual fee.162

153. Joelle Tessler, Comcast, NBC Deal Opens Door for Online Video, USA TODAY
(Feb. 28, 2011, 9:54 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2011-02-28-comcast-onlinevideo_N.htm. These conditions are further discussed in Part II.C infra.
154. See Saul Hansell, ITunes Movie Rentals and Netflix Online: Different Markets, N.Y.
TIMES BITS (Jan. 16, 2008, 5:13 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/16/itunesmovie-rentals-and-netflix-online-different-markets.
155. See Brian Stelter, Netflix To Stream Films From Paramount, Lions Gate, MGM,
N.Y.
TIMES
MEDIA
DECODER
(Aug.
10,
2010,
8:13
AM),
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/10/netflix-to-stream-films-from-paramountlionsgate-mgm.
156. See Schechner, supra note 29.
157. See id.; Barry Silverstein, Netflix-Epix Deal Puts TV Biz on Notice, BRANDCHANNEL
(Aug. 11, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://brandchannel.com/home/post/2010/08/11/Netflix-EpixMoves-Needle.aspx.
158. See Schechner, supra note 29; see also Press Release, EPIX, Epix And Netflix
Announce Exclusive Internet-Only Deal to Instantly Stream EPIX Movies to Netflix
Members (Aug. 10, 2010), http://epixnews.tumblr.com/post/931723470/epix-and-netflixannounce-exclusive-internet-only-deal.
159. See Stelter, supra note 155.
160. See Silverstein, supra note 157.
161. See Michael Corkery, Netflix’s Achilles Heel: Content Costs?, WALL ST. J. DEAL J.
(Aug. 10, 2010, 2:50 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/08/10/netflixs-achilles-heelcontent-costs.
162. Id.
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These figures indicate to content producers that broadband distribution
windows can compensate for the demise of traditional windows.163
Second, the deal provides Netflix with access to new releases in a far earlier
window than it had previously enjoyed, which suggests that it now directly
competes in these windows with premium channels such as HBO and
Showtime, and with bundled MVPD services more generally. 164 Indeed,
Time Warner Cable has indicated that it will not carry EPIX as part of its
cable service packages, in large part because of the Netflix-EPIX deal. 165
Contrary to Netflix’s assertions, 166 the EPIX agreement suggests that the
online distributor is increasingly becoming a substitute for the entrenched
models of the MVPDs. 167 Netflix also engenders conflict with its content
providers, who recognize that Netflix’s effect on film and MVPD
distribution channels may diminish their own revenue streams. 168 As a
result, these content providers may become wary about licensing their
content to Netflix and other online distributors on the same financial terms
as they have in the past, if indeed they continue to license to them at all.169
II. FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF BROADBAND AND MEDIA INDUSTRIES
As the discussion in Part I suggests, the prevalence of broadband
distribution strains the relationship between MVPDs, online distributors,
content producers, and consumers. These tensions are developing against a
broadband regulatory environment in a state of flux. Although the recent
growth of broadband occurred under deregulatory conditions, its increasing
centrality to everyday life has led to calls for oversight. 170 For
commentators addressing the question of federal oversight of broadband—a
163. See Worden, supra note 54 (quoting Viacom’s COO Tom Dooley as stating, “The
[Netflix-EPIX] deal clearly demonstrated that these new players are going to represent
significant revenue streams to studios. . . . There is a new market developing that’s
beginning to replace the physical DVD business.”).
164. See Stelter, supra note 155.
165. See Brett Lang, Time Warner Cable Just Says No to Epix, THE WRAP (Sept. 15,
2010, 2:07 PM), http://www.thewrap.com/television/article/time-warner-wont-carry-epix20883.
166. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
167. See Stelter, supra note 155 (quoting Netflix executive who, when asked about
content that Netflix was still unable to acquire because of content providers’ agreements
with HBO, responded, “Every deal expires . . . and every deal has to be renewed”). Netflix’s
recent entry into original programming further highlights its ability to compete directly with
premium TV channels and MVPDs. See Brian Stelter, Netflix Gets Into the TV Business,
N.Y.
TIMES
MEDIA
DECODER
(Mar.
18,
2011,
1:22
PM),
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/netflix-gets-into-the-tv-business-withfincher-deal. For a discussion on other efforts by broadband distributors to produce original
content, see Sam Schechner, Web Shows Get Ambitious, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2011, at B4
(noting that broadband distributors would be able to compete more effectively with
traditional MVPD services if the first release window occurred through the online service).
168. See Tim Arango, Time Warner Views Netflix as a Fading Star, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
2010, at B1 (discussing the shifting perceptions of content providers toward Netflix as its
broadband distribution dominance has risen).
169. See id.
170. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
529, 531 (2009).
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debate often associated with network neutrality—a fault line exists between
those who believe presumptive FCC regulation is necessary, and those who
feel that antitrust law should be the arbiter of competitive issues in
broadband markets. 171 As a general matter, the governance of the Internet
would seem to fall within the default regulatory ambit of the FCC. 172 After
years of taking a mostly hands-off approach, the FCC has made efforts to
assert its authority over broadband.173 However, in Comcast Corp. v.
FCC, 174 the D.C. Circuit delivered a significant setback to the FCC’s ability
to regulate broadband by rejecting the FCC’s jurisdictional approach to an
order forcing Comcast to alter its broadband network practices. 175 The
FCC pressed on from the Comcast decision and, in a December 2010 order
(Net Neutrality Order), adopted enforceable rules for broadband network
practices, in which the continuing proliferation of broadband video played a
However, because of the significant jurisdictional
central role. 176
ambiguity following Comcast, and the political furor of the network
neutrality debate, whether the FCC’s December order becomes a permanent
oversight regime remains to be seen. 177 Consequently, the question as to
whether the FCC or the antitrust authorities should have jurisdiction over
broadband remains open.
This part discusses federal oversight of broadband and media industries,
and, in particular, addresses questions concerning FCC, DOJ, and FTC
jurisdictional authority over broadband. Part II.A discusses the FCC’s
attempt to regulate broadband, the Comcast decision, and its aftermath.
Part II.B highlights the antitrust response to competition concerns in
broadband and other media industries. Part II.C discusses the process of
dual agency review of telecommunications and media industry mergers, and
highlights several recent mergers that have affected broadband.
A. The FCC’s Attempt To Regulate Broadband
The FCC might have had broadband to itself. At first blush, broadband
appears to fall within the general jurisdictional grant of the
171. Compare Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network
Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329, 329 (2007) (arguing that
proscriptive regulation is necessary), with Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of
an Antitrust Dispute: An Institutional Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate, 7 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 19, 21 (2009) (arguing that broadband competition concerns
are best addressed through antitrust law).
172. See Nuechterlein, supra note 171, at 50 (“It was undisputed until recently that, at the
federal level, the FCC exclusively occupied the field of commercial telecommunications
regulation, supplemented only by the antitrust oversight of the Justice Department.”).
173. See infra Part II.A.2.
174. 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
175. Id. at 644.
176. FED COMMC’NS COMM’N, Preserving the Open Internet, 8–9, 13 (Dec. 21, 2010),
[hereinafter Net Neutrality Order] (rep. and order), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/FCC-10-201A1.pdf; Ryan Lawler, Online Video at the Heart of Net Neutrality
Order, GIGAOM (Dec. 28, 2010, 10:00 AM), http://gigaom.com/video/online-video-netneutrality.
177. See infra notes 273–81 and accompanying text.
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Communications Act, which applies to “all interstate and foreign
communication by wire or radio and all interstate and foreign transmission
of energy by radio.” 178 Pursuant to this grant and the specific authority
given to the FCC in the Communications Act, the FCC has been the
principal regulator of the American communications system since the
Commission’s creation in 1934, and it was believed that the FCC would
possess regulatory authority over broadband by default.179 However,
Commission decisions made during the 2000s regarding the classification
of broadband sowed the seeds for its jurisdictional defeat in Comcast. The
Comcast ruling not only disrupts the default assumption regarding the
FCC’s jurisdiction over the Internet, but also invites an inquiry into whether
the FCC should be the agency governing broadband practices, including the
developing market for broadband video distribution discussed in Part I.
1. Broadband Classification and Ancillary Jurisdiction
Although the FCC is given a broad jurisdictional grant, the substantive
provisions of the Communications Act demarcate the FCC’s express
authority over the various components of the communications system.180
The Communications Act confers upon the FCC specific authority over
three substantive areas: common carrier services, including wireline
telephone networks under Title II; 181 radio, including broadcast television
and cellular telephone networks under Title III; 182 and cable services under
Title VI. 183 Instead of grounding broadband regulation in any of these
express provisions, the Commission tethered its broadband authority to its
“ancillary jurisdiction” under the general provisions of Title I of the
Communications Act. 184 Three Supreme Court decisions carved out the
contours of this ancillary authority: United States v. Southwestern Cable
Co.; 185 United States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest I); 186 and FCC v.
Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest II). 187
Southwestern Cable, like the other two foundational cases associated
with ancillary jurisdiction, was decided prior to the addition of “cable
services” regulations to the Communications Act. 188 In 1966, after the

178. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2006); see also Comcast, 600 F.3d at 646–47 (“Comcast
concedes that . . . the company’s Internet service qualifies as ‘interstate and foreign
communication by wire’ within the meaning of Title I of the Communications Act.”).
179. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
180. See Comcast, 600 F.3d at 645.
181. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–276 (2006).
182. Id. §§ 301–399.
183. Id. §§ 521–573.
184. See supra notes 207–09 and accompanying text.
185. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
186. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
187. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
188. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Title VI, which
gives the FCC express authority over cable services, was added in 1984. See Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521–573 (2006)).
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FCC ordered community antenna television (CATV) 189 providers to stop
redistributing out-of-market broadcasts indiscriminately into local markets,
several CATV providers petitioned for review, arguing that the FCC lacked
authority under the Communications Act to issue the order. 190 The
Commission asserted that the regulation was necessary to protect the
interests of local television broadcasts, over which it had express authority
to regulate under Title III. 191 The Court agreed, holding that the FCC could
exercise jurisdiction over the CATV practice where it was “reasonably
ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission’s various
responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting.” 192 In
establishing this “ancillary jurisdiction,” the Southwestern Cable Court
emphasized the congressional desire to provide the FCC with flexibility in
its regulation of broadcasting and, referring to the broad jurisdictional
language in Title I, stated, “We have found no reason to believe that § 152
does not, as its terms suggest, confer regulatory authority over ‘all interstate
. . . communication by wire or radio.’” 193 Midwest I continued
Southwestern Cable’s use of Title I where such authority was “reasonably
ancillary” to the FCC’s express responsibilities. 194 A plurality of the Court
determined that the FCC had authority to require cable providers to create
new programs for transmission alongside the broadcast stations they
retransmitted. 195 However, in Midwest II, the Court rejected the FCC’s use
of ancillary jurisdiction, striking down an order requiring cable systems to
provide public access to a requisite number of channels. 196 The Midwest II
Court limited the scope of the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction, stating that the
Southwestern Cable doctrine “confer[s] on the Commission a circumscribed
range of power to regulate cable television.” 197
This line of ancillary jurisdiction cases became critical for the question of
broadband regulation. In assessing how to classify cable broadband
service, the FCC lacked statutory direction, as the Communications Act
does not expressly govern broadband. 198 The 1996 Act gave the FCC a
choice between “telecommunications service”199 and “information
service” 200 for the classification of broadband cable modem service. 201 The
189. CATV networks were the forerunners of modern cable systems. See Comcast, 600
F.3d at 646.
190. Sw. Cable, 392 U.S. at 160–61.
191. Id. at 165.
192. Id. at 178.
193. Id. at 173 (alteration in original).
194. 406 U.S. 649, 651 (1972).
195. Id. at 670.
196. 440 U.S. 689, 708–09 (1979).
197. Id. at 696.
198. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2010); NUECHTERLEIN &
WEISER, supra note 15, at 162–64.
199. 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2006).
200. Id. § 153(20).
201. In its classification proceeding, the FCC also considered whether to classify cable
broadband as a “cable service” under Title VI. However, the Commission dispensed with
this option, in part because the Communications Act defines “cable service” as a “one-way
transmission to subscribers,” while Internet activity necessarily involves a two-way
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choice was significant because the Communications Act provides that,
while information services are generally unregulated, telecommunications
services hold themselves out to consumers as common carriers.202
Common carriers—principally associated with local telephone
monopolies 203—are subject to mandatory regulation under Title II, and
must, among other things, charge just and reasonable rates204 that are
nondiscriminatory, 205 and allow competitors to interconnect to their
networks. 206
In 2002, the Commission ruled that broadband cable modem service
should be classified as an information service under the Communications
Act (Cable Modem Order). 207 The FCC was explicit in its deregulatory
motivation, stating that “‘broadband services should exist in a minimal
regulatory environment that promotes investment and innovation in a
competitive market.’” 208 The ruling meant that any authority the FCC
exercised over cable broadband would be pursuant to its Title I ancillary
jurisdiction. 209 A number of parties challenged the FCC’s classification of
broadband, and the issue reached the Supreme Court in National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services. 210 The Court
affirmed the Commission’s classification, holding that “the Commission’s
construction was ‘a reasonable policy choice for the [Commission] to
make.’” 211 The Court’s reasoning was grounded in the deferential standard
it had adopted in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense
Council, Inc. 212
The plaintiffs urged that the FCC’s determination that cable broadband
constituted an information service was unreasonable in that it contradicted
the Commission’s 1998 conclusion that high-speed DSL service was a

interaction. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable & Other
Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4836–37 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem Order] (quoting 47
U.S.C. § 522(6)(A) (2006)).
202. 47 U.S.C. § 153(44); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Assoc. v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 975–76 (2005).
203. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 23.
204. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b).
205. Id. § 202(a).
206. Id. § 251(a)(1).
207. Cable Modem Order, supra note 201, at 4802.
208. Id. (quoting Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over
Wireline Facilities, Universal Serv. Obligations of Broadband Providers, 17 FCC Rcd. 3019,
3022 (2002)).
209. Id. at 4801–02.
210. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
211. Id. at 997. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 845 (1984) (alteration in original)).
212. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In Chevron, the Court held that, where statutory language is
ambiguous, a reviewing court asks only whether the agency construction was permissible,
and does not overturn the agency determination even if the court would interpret the statute
differently. Id. at 843 & n.11. The Court reasoned that, because an agency’s work often
involves questions of policy that the political branches delegate to it, the agency is more
suited to perform the interpretive function—and more accountable to the political process—
than are the courts. Id. at 865–66.
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common carrier service governed under Title II. 213 The Brand X Court
rejected this argument, noting first that the FCC was considering
reclassifying DSL as an information service, 214 and concluding “that the
Commission provided a reasoned explanation for treating cable modem
service differently from DSL service” in light of the FCC’s analysis of
changed market circumstances.215
Notably, in several instances in dicta, the Brand X Court appeared to
confirm that the Commission possessed Title I ancillary authority over
broadband.
In discussing the statutory distinctions between
telecommunications services and information services in the 1996 Act, the
Court wrote that “[i]nformation-service providers, by contrast, are not
subject to mandatory common-carrier regulation under Title II, though the
Commission has jurisdiction to impose additional regulatory obligations
under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction to regulate interstate and foreign
communications.” 216
Shortly after the Brand X decision, the FCC reclassified DSL service as
an information service in its Wireline Broadband Order,217 a decision that
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in Time Warner
Telecom, Inc. v. FCC. 218 Subsequently, the Commission extended
information service classification to broadband service over power lines219
and wireless networks. 220 Through these classification decisions, the FCC
established a deregulatory regime with respect to its authority over
broadband. As the FCC stated in the Wireline Broadband Order, “[t]his
framework establishes a minimal regulatory environment for wireline
broadband Internet access services to benefit American consumers and
promote innovative and efficient communications.”221
Despite the deregulatory posture of its classification orders, the FCC
asserted its regulatory authority over the Internet in September 2005 with its

213. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1000–01; see also Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering
Advanced Telecomms., 13 FCC Rcd. 24,011, 24,029–31 (1998) (defining DSL service as a
“telecommunications service”).
214. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1002 (citing Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to
the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 3019, 3030 (2002) (notice of proposed
rulemaking)).
215. Id. at 1000–01.
216. Id. at 976; see also id. at 996 (“[T]he Commission remains free to impose special
regulatory duties on facilities-based ISPs under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction.”).
217. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853, 14,856 (2005) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband Order] (rep.
and order & notice of proposed rulemaking).
218. 507 F.3d 205, 208 (3d Cir. 2007).
219. United Power Line Council’s Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the
Classification of Broadband Over Power Line Internet Access Serv. as an Info. Serv., 21
FCC Rcd. 13,281, 13,281 (2006) (mem. op. and order).
220. Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over
Wireless Networks, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901, 5901 (2007) (declaratory ruling).
221. Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 217, at 14,855.
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Internet Policy Statement, 222 released on the same day as the FCC ordered
the reclassification of DSL as an information service. 223 The Internet
Policy Statement articulated four principles that would guide the
Commission in its approach to Internet activity. 224 These principles
provide that consumers using the Internet should be entitled to access legal
content of their choosing, to run applications and use services of their
choice, to connect devices to the network, and to enjoy competition among
network, application, and service providers.225 The Internet Policy
Statement incorporates the FCC’s classification decisions and its reliance
on its Title I ancillary authority. 226 In particular, the FCC relied on the
Brand X dicta discussed above, asserting that the Commission “‘has
jurisdiction to impose additional regulatory obligations under its Title I
ancillary
jurisdiction
to
regulate
interstate
and
foreign
communications.’” 227 In the Internet Policy Statement, the Commission
hinged its ancillary authority as governed by the Southwestern Cable
standard on two policy provisions embedded in the Communications
Act. 228 Section 230(b) of the Communications Act states that “[i]t is the
policy of the United States . . . to promote the continued development of the
Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive
media.” 229 Further, Section 706(a) of the 1996 Act provides that the
“Commission . . . shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable and
timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all
Americans.” 230 The FCC asserted that the Internet Policy Statement was
not an enforceable set of rules, but a group of principles that would guide
the FCC in its approach to Internet practices.231
In addition to the Internet Policy Statement, the FCC indicated its intent
to oversee broadband practices in October 2009 when it adopted a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (2009 NPRM) with respect to “preserving the open
Internet.” 232 In the 2009 NPRM, the FCC sought comment on whether it
222. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,986 (2005) [hereinafter Internet Policy Statement] (policy
statement).
223. See id. at 14,986; Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 217, at 14,853.
224. Internet Policy Statement, supra note 222, at 14,988.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 14,987–88.
227. Id. (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Assoc. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 976 (2005)).
228. Id. at 14,987.
229. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006). Section 230 was added to the Communications Act as
part of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat.
133, 137–39. Section 230 was codified in order to give providers and users of interactive
services immunity both from publishing harmful content provided by others and from taking
steps to restrict access to such content. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)–(2).
230. 47 U.S.C. § 157 note (1996) (Advanced Telecommunications Incentives).
231. Internet Policy Statement, supra note 222, at 14,988 & n.15.
232. Preserving the Open Internet, 24 FCC Rcd. 13,064 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 NPRM].
Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, the FCC promulgates notices of proposed
rulemaking, allowing for notice to, and comment from, interested parties prior to the
adoption of Commission rules. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2006).
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should codify into rules the four principles enunciated in the Internet Policy
Statement. 233 The Commission also proposed two additional rules. The
first would impose “nondiscrimination” on broadband providers, meaning
that they would not be able to enter into agreements with content or
applications providers to prioritize certain network traffic.234 Second, the
FCC proposed a rule of “transparency,” which would require broadband
providers to disclose their network management practices to users.235 The
FCC also sought comment on whether it should proceed against violations
of the principles contained in the Internet Policy Statement on a case-bycase basis, as opposed to enacting prophylactic rules.236
2. Comcast Corp. v. FCC and Its Aftermath
The FCC’s first foray into enforcing the broadband policies delineated in
the Internet Policy Statement occurred, oddly enough, prior to the adoption
of the Internet Policy Statement. In 2005, the Commission entered into a
consent decree with Madison River Communications (Madison River).237
There, Madison River, a local telephone company that also provided
broadband service, agreed to discontinue its practice of blocking access to
voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service, 238 which Madison River
viewed as a competitor to its local telephone operations. 239 Although the
actions concerned practices involving Madison River’s broadband network,
the FCC grounded the ruling not in its ancillary jurisdiction, but in the
common carrier provisions of Title II of the Communications Act.240
Despite this, the Commission used the Madison River consent decree as a
basis for its authority to adopt the Internet Policy Statement. 241
In 2007, the Associated Press discovered that Comcast was interfering
with its broadband customers’ use of peer-to-peer networks, including
BitTorrent. 242 A public interest organization filed a complaint with the
FCC, asking the Commission to enforce its Internet Policy Statement and to
stop Comcast from engaging in these practices. 243 The FCC obliged and in
August 2008 ordered Comcast to cease and desist its actions against peerto-peer networks by the end of 2008, and to provide the FCC with details of
its revised network management practices.244 Comcast complied with the
233. 2009 NPRM, supra note 232, at 13,101.
234. Id. at 13,104–08.
235. Id. at 13,108–11.
236. Id. at 13,067–68.
237. Madison River Commc’ns, LLC, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295 (2005) [hereinafter Madison
River].
238. VoIP is an Internet-based application that allows customers to place telephone calls
over broadband networks. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 191–93.
239. Madison River, supra note 237, at 4296.
240. See id.
241. Internet Policy Statement, supra note 222, at 14,988 n.12.
242. Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13,028, 13,031 (2008) (mem.
op. and order).
243. Id. at 13,032.
244. Id. at 13,028.
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FCC’s requirements, but nevertheless petitioned the D.C. Circuit for
review. 245 Comcast challenged the FCC’s order on three grounds: (1) the
FCC lacked jurisdiction over Comcast’s broadband network management
practices, (2) the Commission circumvented the appropriate rulemaking
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, and (3) the order was
arbitrary and capricious. 246 The D.C. Circuit ruled only with respect to the
jurisdictional question. 247 The court vacated the order against Comcast,
holding that the FCC had failed to establish proper ancillary jurisdiction to
intervene in the underlying dispute.248
In so deciding, the D.C. Circuit rejected a host of arguments that the FCC
advanced in support of its jurisdiction. The court recognized that the
continuing viability of the Cable Modem Order meant that jurisdiction
could only be based on the FCC’s ancillary authority. 249 However, the
court concluded that the sections of the Communications Act that the FCC
had relied upon in adopting the Internet Policy Statement were inadequate
to confer ancillary jurisdiction.250 The FCC argued that Sections 1 and
230(b) of the Communications Act established congressional policy that
gave the FCC authority to regulate with respect to broadband, but the D.C.
Circuit rejected this policy-based approach to the Commission’s Title I
authority, concluding that “statements of policy, by themselves, do not
create ‘statutorily mandated responsibilities.’”251
In addition to rejecting the FCC’s substantive approach to ancillary
jurisdiction, the court dealt the Commission a significant procedural blow.
The FCC argued that the Supreme Court’s dicta in Brand X, which had
seemingly confirmed the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction over broadband,252
should be dispositive of its authority to issue the Comcast Order. The D.C.
Circuit rejected this argument, but went beyond a finding that Brand X was
not controlling. 253 In distilling the scope of the FCC’s ancillary authority
through an analysis of the Supreme Court rulings in Southwestern Cable,
Midwest I, and Midwest II, 254 the D.C. Circuit determined that those cases
stood for the proposition that each assertion of Title I power needed to be
justified separately. 255 Accordingly, even if the Brand X dicta controlled
with respect to the particular network management practices at issue in
Brand X, it was not subject to any weight in the proceeding against
Comcast because “the Commission must defend its exercise of ancillary
authority on a case-by-case basis.” 256
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 661.
Id. at 645–46.
Id. at 644.
Id. (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
Comcast, 600 F.3d at 649–51.
See supra notes 185–97.
Comcast, 600 F.3d at 651.
Id.
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The Comcast decision brought an abrupt halt to the FCC’s new
regulatory regime for the Internet, with the Commission itself
acknowledging that the ruling cast doubt upon its ability to further enforce
the Internet Policy Statement.257 Although it recognized that the Comcast
decision invalidated the particular ancillary jurisdiction approach it had
attempted to exercise, the FCC asserted that the “[D.C. Circuit] in no way
disagreed with the importance of preserving a free and open Internet; nor
did it close the door to other methods for achieving this important end.”258
For its part, Comcast claimed that it fully supported the principles espoused
in the Internet Policy Statement, and that its petition before the D.C. Circuit
was intended merely to clear its name. 259
On May 6, 2010, one month after the Comcast ruling, FCC Chairman
Julius Genachowski announced the Commission’s intent to reassert its
jurisdiction over broadband, outlining three potential avenues for the
Commission to proceed, including the possibility of reclassifying
broadband service as a telecommunications service under Title II. 260 The
FCC’s goal, said Genachowski, was to determine “the best method for
restoring the shared understanding of FCC authority that existed before the
Comcast decision.” 261 On June 17, 2010, the FCC adopted a formal notice
of inquiry that sought public comment regarding the broadband
reclassification question.262 However, on December 21, 2010, the
Commission officially marked a departure from broadband reclassification,
and issued a report and order (Net Neutrality Order) that established formal
rules governing broadband provider practices.263 The Net Neutrality Order
codified three “prophylactic”264 rules governing broadband provider
activity that were culled from the rules outlined in the 2009 NPRM 265: (1)
a “transparency” rule requiring broadband providers to disclose their
network management practices; (2) a ban on the blocking of legal content,
applications, and services by fixed (i.e., non-wireless) providers; and (3) a
modified version of the non-discrimination policy proposed in the 2009
NPRM, also applicable only to fixed broadband providers. 266 The last two
rules are subject to exceptions for broadband providers’ “reasonable
network management,” the determination of which will be subject to caseby-case adjudications. 267 The non-discrimination rule adopted in the Net
257. See Genachowski, supra note 9, at 3–4.
258. Advisory, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Statement on Comcast v. FCC, (Apr. 6,
2010), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-297355A1.pdf.
259. Press Release, Comcast Corp., Comcast Statement on U.S. Court of Appeals
Decision on Comcast v. FCC (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.comcast.com/About/PressRelease/
PressReleaseDetail.ashx?PRID=984.
260. See Genachowski, supra note 9, at 3–6.
261. Id. at 6.
262. Framework for Broadband Internet Serv., 25 FCC Rcd. 7866 (2010) (notice of
inquiry).
263. Net Neutrality Order, supra note 176.
264. Id. at 3.
265. See supra notes 232–36 and accompanying text.
266. Net Neutrality Order, supra note 176, at 2.
267. Id. at 24, 82.
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Neutrality Order diverged from the rule proposed in the 2009 NPRM in
that, instead of a flat ban on discriminatory practices, the FCC’s latest rule
bars only “unreasonable discrimination.” 268 However, although the FCC
did not affirmatively rule out commercial arrangements between broadband
providers and online services to prioritize particular network traffic—
agreements that lie at the core of concerns regarding Comcast’s ability to
leverage NBCU content through broadband services such as TV
Everywhere 269—the Commission made it clear that these agreements would
be subject to heightened scrutiny, and likely disallowed. 270
In adopting the Net Neutrality Order, the FCC again asserted its ancillary
authority to promulgate the rules, justifying its jurisdiction over broadband
as a necessary exercise of its Title I power to effectuate a host of provisions
in Titles II, III, and VI of the Communications Act, as well as on the policybased authority in Section 230(b) of the Communications Act and Section
706(a) of the 1996 Act that it had used to promulgate the Internet Policy
Statement. 271 As to enforcement, the FCC adopted mechanisms for
informal and formal complaints by “any person,” in addition to a complaint
process that could be initiated by the Commission. 272
The Net Neutrality Order, although adopted by a majority of the FCC,
certainly is not the final statement on the question of the FCC’s authority to
regulate broadband. Dissenting Commissioner Robert McDowell predicted
that courts would overturn the Net Neutrality Order on jurisdictional
grounds as the D.C. Circuit had in Comcast. 273 Indeed, shortly after the
rules were announced, Verizon challenged the FCC’s authority to
promulgate them, seeking appeal before the same three judges in the D.C.
Circuit that had ruled against the Commission in Comcast. 274 The D.C.
Circuit dismissed the Verizon lawsuit in April 2011 because the company
had appealed prior to publication of the rules in the Federal Register, but
Verizon expressed its intent to re-file once such publication occurs.275
Shortly after the FCC adopted the new rules, congressional Republicans
promised to introduce resolutions that would curtail the FCC’s ability to
implement the Net Neutrality Order.276 The first attack along these lines
occurred in February 2011, when the House of Representatives voted to
268. Id. at 24.
269. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text.
270. Net Neutrality Order, supra note 176, at 43–44.
271. Id. at 62–77, 87; see also supra note 230 and accompanying text.
272. Net Neutrality Order, supra note 176, at 82–85.
273. Id. at 148–50 (McDowell, Comm’r, dissenting).
274. Juliana Gruenwald, Verizon Files Appeal of FCC Net Neutrality Order, NAT’L J.
TECH DAILY DOSE (Jan. 20, 2011, 4:17 PM), http://techdailydose.nationaljournal.com/2011/
01/verizon-files-appeal-of-fcc-ne.php; Ryan Singel, Verizon Files Suit Against FCC Net
Neutrality
Rules,
WIRED
EPICENTER
(Jan.
20,
2011,
5:26
PM),
http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/01/verizon-sues-fcc.
275. See Amy Schatz, Internet-Rule Suits Rejected by Appeals Court, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5,
2011, at B11.
276. See David Hatch et al., FCC’s Split Vote on Network-Neutrality Rules Only Inflames
Debate, NAT’L J. (Dec. 21, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/fcc-s-split-voteon-network-neutrality-rules-only-inflames-debate-20101221.
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defund any FCC allotments that would be utilized to implement the
provisions of the Net Neutrality Order,277 a resolution that the Senate
subsequently rejected.278 In March 2011, the House Subcommittee on
Communications and Technology voted a bill up to the full House Energy
and Commerce Committee that would invalidate the Net Neutrality
Order, 279 a resolution that the full House passed a month later. 280 The bill
faces considerable hurdles, as it would need to be approved by the Senate
and President Barack Obama before the Net Neutrality Order could be
overturned. 281 Nevertheless, even if these actions only amount to political
posturing, they illustrate that the Net Neutrality Order is merely the most
recent point of contention in the expanding argument over the proper
method of oversight of broadband practices.
B. Antitrust Oversight of Telecommunications and Media Industries
Although their interaction with broadband has not been as substantial as
the FCC’s, the DOJ and the FTC have a considerable history of overseeing
competitive issues in the telecommunications and media sectors. These
agencies, which conduct reviews on a case-by-case basis and focus almost
entirely on the competitive effects of market practices,282 have been
proffered as the principal alternatives to the FCC in supervising broadbandrelated issues. 283 This section outlines the relevant history of the DOJ and
the FTC with respect to broadband and telecommunications, and discusses
the jurisdictional authority issues facing an antitrust broadband video
oversight regime.
1. Department of Justice
a. AT&T Consent Decree
The most prominent telecommunications oversight action of the past
half-century was the consent decree entered into between the DOJ and
AT&T, which resulted in the divestiture of local telephone monopolies—
277. Cecilia Kang, House Votes To Stop FCC Funding for Net Neutrality, WASH. POST
POST TECH. (Feb. 17, 2011, 7:05 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2011/02/
house_votes_to_stop_funds_for.html.
278. John Eggerton, Senate Rejects House CR with FCC, CPB Cuts, BROAD. & CABLE
(Mar.
9,
2011,
6:32
PM),
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/465034Senate_Rejects_House_CR_with_FCC_CPB_Cuts.php.
279. Cecilia Kang, House Panel Votes To Invalidate Net Neutrality Rules, WASH. POST
POST TECH. (Mar. 9, 2011, 5:49 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2011/03/
house_panel_votes_to_invalidat.html.
280. Cecilia Kang, House Approves Measure To Overturn FCC Net Neutrality Rules,
WASH. POST POST TECH. (Apr. 08, 2011, 5:15 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
post-tech/post/house-approves-measure-to-overturn-fcc-net-neutrality-rules/2011/04/08/
AFBQCc3C_blog.html.
281. Id.
282. See James R. Weiss & Martin L. Stern, Serving Two Masters: The Dual Jurisdiction
of the FCC and the Justice Department over Telecommunications Transactions, 6
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 195, 195, 197 (1998).
283. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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called regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs)—from the corporate
AT&T parent, 284 a case in which antitrust oversight took precedence over
continued FCC regulation. There, the DOJ convinced Judge Harold Greene
that the FCC was incapable of effective regulatory enforcement over
AT&T’s monopoly in local and long-distance telephone service.285 In
addition to the divestiture of AT&T’s local telephone business, the consent
decree placed line-of-business restrictions upon the newly created RBOCs.
First, the RBOCs were prohibited from engaging in telecommunications
equipment manufacturing, addressing concerns that the RBOCs could
leverage equipment prices to boost profits where they could not have done
so under local telephone rate regulations.286 Another important restriction
in the decree precluded RBOCs from entering the long-distance market
unless they convinced the DOJ that doing so would not be an
anticompetitive act.287
After the consent decree took effect in 1984, Judge Greene presided over
the DOJ’s enforcement of the decree until passage of the 1996 Act.288
Indeed, one purpose of the 1996 Act, which directly abolished the AT&T
consent decree, 289 was to eliminate the control that Judge Greene held over
the telecommunications industry. 290
b. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP
and the Future of Antitrust Oversight of Telecommunications and Media
Industries
While the DOJ dominated the regulation of the telecommunications
industry in the years following the AT&T divestiture, the continued reliance
on antitrust authorities to administer competition policy in this sector has
been called into question both by provisions of the 1996 Act and by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices
of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP. 291 As noted above, the 1996 Act specifically
eliminated further enforcement of the AT&T consent decree, replacing this
with a series of competition policies subject to FCC enforcement. 292 In
addition, the 1996 Act eliminated many of the line-of-business restrictions
that had been imposed under the consent decree, including RBOC entry into

284. See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
285. Id. at 168; see also NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 417.
286. NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 59.
287. Id. at 62.
288. Id. at 417.
289. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 143 (1996) (codified as amended at
47 U.S.C. § 152 note (2006)).
290. James B. Speta, FCC Authority To Regulate the Internet: Creating It and Limiting
It, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 15, 28 & n.68 (2003).
291. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
292. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 417.
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the long distance and equipment manufacturing business. 293 The regulatory
provisions in the 1996 Act specifically directed the FCC to oversee many of
the antitrust-like concerns that had been handled by the DOJ and Judge
Greene during the dozen years of enforcement of the AT&T consent
decree. 294 Although these provisions suggest that Congress placed
oversight of telecommunications firmly in the hands of the FCC, the 1996
Act also includes an antitrust savings clause (Savings Clause) that, aside
from the elimination of consent decrees, purports to maintain the status quo
with respect to antitrust law. 295
In Trinko, the Supreme Court cast further doubt upon the continued
reliance on antitrust law to enforce competition in the telecommunications
industry. There, AT&T customers within Verizon’s monopolized New
York City local telephone market brought an antitrust action against
Verizon under Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, alleging that
Verizon had failed to properly connect its network to competitive entrants,
including AT&T. 296 Prior to this private antitrust action, Verizon had
entered into a consent decree with the FCC that forced Verizon to better
conform to requirements that it interconnect its wireline facilities to
competitive local operators in exchange for the right to enter the long
distance business. 297 First, the Court concluded that the alleged activity did
not raise a claim under section 2. 298 The Court proceeded to determine that
antitrust remedies generally would be limited in the situation presented
because, where there exists “a regulatory structure designed to deter and
remedy anticompetitive harm,” then “the additional benefit to competition
provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small.” 299 The Court
found that the regulatory scheme enacted by the 1996 Act was one that
likely would preclude the existence of any separate antitrust harm. 300
The fallout from Trinko remains uncertain, as there are various
interpretations of the Court’s seeming rejection of antitrust intervention into
regulated industries. 301 But at the minimum, it appears that Trinko
reflected the continued rise of FCC enforcement over telecommunications

293. See Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the Telecommunications
Act: Regulation of Telecommunications Under Judge Greene, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1395,
1457–58 (1999).
294. See Nuechterlein, supra note 171, at 43–44.
295. 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (2006) (Applicability of Consent Decrees and Other Law)
(“[N]othing in this Act . . . shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the
applicability of any of the antitrust laws.”).
296. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 402–03, 405.
297. Id. at 403.
298. Id. at 410–11.
299. Id. at 412; see also NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 417 (stating that the
Trinko decision “concluded that antitrust courts are generally inappropriate forums for the
ongoing management of telecommunications competition policy, at least so long as the
industry remains subject to pervasive regulation”).
300. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412.
301. See Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REV.
273, 319 (2008) (describing possible narrow and broad readings of the Court’s Trinko
holding).
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earlier advanced by the 1996 Act.302 However, despite the 1996 Act and
the Trinko decision, it is not certain that FCC regulation would supersede
antitrust jurisdiction over broadband. The Trinko Court specifically
characterized antitrust enforcement as unnecessary in regulated industries
that have defined structures for preventing competitive harm. 303 Because
the status of broadband as a regulated industry remains a part of the central
debate of its governance following Comcast, even a broad reading of Trinko
may not foreclose antitrust oversight of broadband practices.304
2. Federal Trade Commission
The FTC’s engagement with broadband has been more direct than the
DOJ’s. After a yearlong inquiry into the broadband marketplace, the FTC
released a report (FTC Staff Report) in 2007, addressing the need for the
agency to enforce competition policy in the sector.305 The FTC Staff
Report adopts a deregulatory approach to broadband, noting that the
industry is “young and dynamic” and that the FTC had not identified any
instances of market failure in the broadband market. 306 Specifically, the
FTC Staff Report warned against hasty regulatory intervention in an effort
to prevent prospective harms. 307 Despite concluding that action was
unnecessary—and indicating that regulatory action might indeed have
adverse effects on consumers—the FTC indicated that it would continue to
work to promote broadband access.308
The FTC, like the FCC and the DOJ, also lacks clearly defined
jurisdiction over broadband practices.
Under the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC Act), the FTC is precluded from enforcing unfair
competition laws against “common carriers.” 309 As a result, the FTC has
not played a significant role in federal oversight of the telecommunications
industry. 310 However, as discussed above, the Brand X Court affirmed the
FCC’s decision to classify broadband as an information service under the
Communications Act. 311 In the FTC Staff Report, the FTC grounded its
302. See, e.g., NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 418–19 (suggesting that
“specialized regulatory agencies, led by the FCC, will play the dominant role in setting
telecommunications competition policy for the foreseeable future”); Nuechterlein, supra
note 171, at 44 (noting that Trinko, along with a subsequent Supreme Court decision, suggest
that “as prescriptive regulation of a field waxes, antitrust enforcement must wane”).
303. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412.
304. Nuechterlein, supra note 171, at 44 & n.62 (suggesting that the “basis for caution in
the judicial application of antitrust law would be absent if the FCC were deemed to lack
jurisdiction over a given regulatory area”).
305. FED. TRADE COMM’N, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY (2007)
[hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/broadband/
v070000report.pdf.
306. Id. at 11.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 12.
309. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006); see also James B. Speta, The Shaky Foundations of the
Regulated Internet, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 127 (2010).
310. See Nuechterlein, supra note 171, at 50.
311. See supra notes 210–16 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction over broadband in the Brand X ruling, arguing that, as
broadband services are not common carriers, the exemption in the FTC Act
does not apply. 312 The question as to whether the FTC possesses
jurisdiction over broadband under the FTC Act is therefore uncertain. 313
C. Dual Agency Review of Telecommunications Mergers
The passage of the 1996 Act ushered in a wave of telecommunications
mergers. 314 Comcast’s acquisition of NBCU discussed above is just the
latest in a decade-long trend of vast consolidation in the
telecommunications and media industries.315 In almost all instances, both
the antitrust authorities—either the DOJ or the FTC—and the FCC
concurrently review major mergers in this sector. As the discussion above
illustrates, the FCC, DOJ, and FTC each face significant jurisdictional
questions in connection with continued oversight of broadband. However,
over the past decade, these agencies have made a number of determinations
with respect to telecommunications and media mergers that elucidate their
respective approach to broadband practices.
1. Antitrust Review Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act
The DOJ and the FTC principally review mergers under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 316 which bars any merger or acquisition whose consummation
may be “substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.” 317 Under the Clayton Act, the DOJ and the FTC possess
concurrent jurisdiction over mergers and acquisitions. 318 However, as
discussed above, the FTC does not have jurisdiction over common
carriers. 319 Accordingly, the DOJ conducts antitrust review of the majority
of mergers in the telecommunications sector.320 In instances where a

312. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 305, at 38.
313. See Nuechterlein, supra note 171, at 50–51 (noting that Brand X’s determination that
the FCC may classify broadband as an “information service” may not provide a basis for the
Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) jurisdiction over broadband, because the FTC may not
be able to rely upon an interpretation of a provision in the Communications Act to define a
term in the Federal Trade Commission Act).
314. See Weiss & Stern, supra note 282, at 201–05 (listing major telecommunications
mergers in the several years following passage of the 1996 Act); see also David A. Curran,
Rethinking Federal Review of Telecommunications Mergers, 28 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 747, 748
& n.10 (2002).
315. See supra Part I.D.1.
316. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006); see also Donald J. Russell & Sherri Lynn Wolson, Dual
Antitrust Review of Telecommunications Mergers by the Department of Justice and the
Federal Communications Commission, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 143, 144 (2002) (noting that
the Department of Justice (DOJ) may review mergers under the Sherman Act in rare
instances).
317. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
318. See id.; see also Russell & Wolson, supra note 316, at 143 n.1.
319. See 15 U.S.C. § 21(a); see also supra note 309 and accompanying text.
320. See Russell & Wolson, supra note 316, at 143 n.1.
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common carrier is not involved, the DOJ and the FTC conduct a clearance
process to determine which agency will oversee the review. 321
The manner in which the antitrust authorities handle merger review
changed with the passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976 322 (HSR Act). The HSR Act establishes a premerger
notification process, requiring the merging parties to serve notice upon the
reviewing agency and await review prior to consummating the merger.323
The antitrust authorities assess the merits of these mergers pursuant to
jointly crafted Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which were updated in
2010. 324 After review, if the antitrust agency believes that the proposed
merger will result in anticompetitive activity, it bears the burden of
establishing a section 7 violation before a federal district court.325 Merger
reviews are often settled through consent decrees whereby the merging
parties agree to conditions to the merger in order to gain antitrust
approval. 326 Under DOJ guidelines, where the agency extracts such
conditions from merging parties, “[t]here must be a significant nexus
between the proposed transaction, the nature of the competitive harm, and
the proposed remedial provisions.” 327
2. FCC Review Under the Communications Act
Under the Clayton Act, the FCC possesses concurrent review authority of
telecommunications mergers with the antitrust authorities.328 However, the
FCC generally reviews mergers under the Communications Act,329 an
authority that stems from the transfer of common carrier or broadcast
licenses as part of the merger, which the FCC must find are transferred in
the “public interest.” 330 As a result of this requirement, the merging parties
have the burden of convincing the FCC that the merger should be
approved. 331 FCC merger reviews often result in “voluntary” conditions
being imposed on the merging parties, a result that is shielded from judicial
review. 332
321. See id.
322. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383, 1390 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006)).
323. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)–(b).
324. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES,
(Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html.
325. See Russell & Wolson, supra note 316, at 147; see also United States v. Citizens &
S. Nat’l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120 (1975) (applying requirement that government make out
prima facie case under Section 7 of the Clayton Act).
326. See Russell & Wolson, supra note 316, at 147.
327. ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO
MERGER REMEDIES 2 (2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf.
328. 15 U.S.C. § 21(a); see also Russell & Wolson, supra note 316, at 144–45.
329. See Weiss & Stern, supra note 282, at 198 (suggesting that the FCC “never uses the
Clayton Act as its basis for proceeding” in merger reviews).
330. See 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (requiring that the Commission certify that common carrier
lines are licensed or acquired for “the present or future public convenience and necessity”);
id. § 310(d) (2006) (requiring that the FCC find that transfer of radio licenses will serve the
“public interest, convenience, and necessity”).
331. See Weiss & Stern, supra note 282, at 197–98 & n.24.
332. See Russell & Wolson, supra note 316, at 149.
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There has been considerable criticism leveled at the FCC in connection
with its merger review process. 333 Typically, this criticism focuses on the
length of time that the FCC takes to conduct its reviews, the extent to which
the conditions it places on the parties are unrelated to the merger, and the
lack of clearly defined review standards.334 However, despite attempts for
significant reform or repeal of the FCC’s authority in this regard, the
Commission continues to assert itself in this arena.335
3. Recent Telecommunications and Media Mergers
Several of the most significant mergers in the past decade have
reformulated portions of the former AT&T monopoly and, despite stiff
public opposition, have been approved both by the DOJ and the FCC. 336 In
2005, SBC Communications, a RBOC created as part of the AT&T
divestiture, acquired its former corporate parent, AT&T.337 In a similar
acquisition that same year, Verizon, another RBOC, merged with MCI,
formerly a major competitor to AT&T in the long distance market. 338 In its
review under the HSR Act, the DOJ, concerned that the merged entities
would unduly consolidate specialized broadband services, forced both
merging groups to divest specific fiber optic channels to competitors.339
The FCC, meanwhile, forced the merging companies to agree to adhere to
the terms of the Internet Policy Statement following the merger.340 When
the newly merged AT&T acquired RBOC BellSouth in 2007, the DOJ
imposed no conditions on the merger, 341 while the FCC again required,
among other things, that the merged entity abide by the Internet Policy
Statement for thirty months following the merger. 342
In addition to these telecommunications mergers, several reviews of
mergers between media firms demonstrate how the various agencies have
approached the competitive ramifications of these alignments. In a 1996
merger involving Time Warner and Turner Broadcasting, the FTC forced
Time Warner to carry alternative news channels on its cable systems, in
333. See generally Rachel E. Barkow & Peter W. Huber, A Tale of Two Agencies: A
Comparative Analysis of FCC and DOJ Review of Telecommunications Mergers, 2000 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 29.
334. See Philip J. Weiser, Reexamining the Legacy of Dual Regulation: Reforming Dual
Merger Review by the DOJ and the FCC, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 168–69 (2008)
(summarizing critiques of FCC merger review).
335. See Harold Feld, The Need for FCC Merger Review, 18 COMM. LAW. 20, 20 (2000)
(discussing instances where Congress considered eliminating, but ultimately left intact, FCC
merger review authority).
336. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at xvi.
337. SBC Commc’ns Inc. & AT&T Corp. Applications for Approval of Transfer of
Control, 20 FCC Rcd. 18,290 (2005) [hereinafter SBC-AT&T Order] (mem. op. and order).
338. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. & MCI, Inc., Applications for Approval of Transfer of
Control, 20 FCC Rcd. 18,433 (2005) [hereinafter Verizon-MCI Order] (mem. op. and order).
339. See United States v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6–7 (D.D.C. 2007).
340. See SBC-AT&T Order, supra note 337, at 18,368, 18,414; Verizon-MCI Order,
supra note 338, at 18,509, 18,561; see also supra note 222 and accompanying text.
341. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at xvii & n.2.
342. AT&T Inc. & BellSouth Corp. Application for Transfer of Control, 22 FCC Rcd.
5662, 5814–16 (2007) (mem. op. and order).

2011]

SEEKING A CLEARER PICTURE

2947

addition to Turner-owned CNN. 343 The FTC also reviewed the 1999
merger between AOL and Time Warner and, as an approval condition,
required the merged entity to provide open access to its cable service
facilities in order to accommodate rival broadband providers.344 The FCC,
on the other hand, required AOL to allow competitors to interconnect to its
dominant instant messenger service. 345 The FCC’s requirement has been
criticized as an example of the Commission’s failure to engage in
appropriate decision making with respect to its merger review authority.346
Perhaps confirming this criticism, the FCC decided to repeal the instant
messenger interconnection requirement two years after approving the AOLTime Warner merger. 347
The Comcast-NBCU merger discussed in Part I.D.1 represents the latest
in this line of dual FCC and antitrust reviews. In a coordinated effort, the
FCC and the DOJ imposed conditions upon the merger that aggressively
address potential conflicts in the market for broadband video
distribution. 348 The conditions imposed give validation to the rise of
broadband video distributors, as online distributors will have the same
ability to bargain for bundled packages of NBCU content from Comcast as
will traditional MVPDs. 349 Comcast will be required to offer NBCU
content to online distributors who enter into comparable content agreements
with NBCU’s content producer peers.350 Comcast must take measures to
ensure that NBCU content is available online,351 and must also agree to the
nondiscrimination rule contained in the Net Neutrality Order. 352 Notably,
Comcast agreed to adhere to many of the conditions for seven years.353
343. See Time Warner Inc., FTC File No. 961-0004, at 16–17 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Sept.
12, 1996) (decision and order), http://www.ftc.gov/os/1996/09/twconsnt.pdf.
344. See Am. Online, Inc. & Time Warner Inc., FTC Docket No. C-3989, at 11 (Fed.
Trade Comm’n Apr. 17, 2001) (decision and order), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/
aoltwdo.pdf; NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 160–62.
345. Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses & Section 214
Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. & Am. Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time Warner
Inc., Transferee, 16 FCC Rcd. 6547, 6610–11 (2001) (mem. op. and order).
346. See Daniel L. Brenner, Creating Effective Broadband Network Regulation, 62 FED.
COMM. L.J. 13, 35 (2010) (criticizing the FCC’s failure to anticipate the development of
competitive instant messaging technology); Philip J. Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC
Reform, and the Hidden Side of the Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 675, 708–09
(2009) (criticizing the FCC for the lack of nexus between the imposed instant messenger
obligation and the merger, and for the Commission’s failure to adequately delineate its
jurisdiction over instant messaging services).
347. Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses & Section 214
Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and Am. Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time
Warner Inc., Transferee, 18 FCC Rcd. 16,835 (2003).
348. Press Release, supra note 151 (quoting the head of the DOJ Antitrust Division,
Assistant Attorney General Christine Varney, as stating that the DOJ “worked in close
cooperation and unprecedented coordination” with the FCC on the merger review).
349. Id. The offline corollary to this requirement, the FCC’s “program access rules,” is
discussed infra in Part III.B.3.
350. News, supra note 150.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. See Stelter & Arango, supra note 141 (noting that the seven-year duration is “an
unusually long period of time” for merger conditions).
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While the conditions are expressly designed to promote the development of
the broadband video space, there is some question as to whether having
online distributors bargain as MVPDs will force the online space into an
MVPD-like business model. 354
III. THE FCC AND ANTITRUST OPTIONS: SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL
DEBATES
As Part II suggests, the assessment of any regulatory regime for the
distribution of video content over broadband must begin with the question
of jurisdiction. Each of the agencies proposed as potential regulators in this
area—the FCC, the DOJ, and the FTC—are presented with a number of
hurdles in connection with their authority to oversee this developing
market. But, beyond the question of authority, the jurisdictional muddle
following Comcast has reinvigorated the debate over whether broadband is
best addressed through FCC regulation or antitrust oversight. 355 These
debates center on the substantive and procedural approaches of these
agencies in an effort to assess the relative efficacy of possible oversight
regimes.
This part outlines the ways in which these two oversight methodologies
are likely to approach the market for broadband video distribution, with
particular emphasis on the concerns raised in connection with the recent
transactions discussed in Part I.D. Part III.A discusses the debate over
whether vertical consolidation concerns should play a role in a broadband
video oversight regime. Part III.B discusses debates over non-competition
concerns in broadband markets, and the extent to which the FCC and
antitrust authorities are equipped to address these concerns. Part III.C
addresses procedural paradigms of the FCC and antitrust authorities that
likely would impact their effectiveness in addressing broadband video
issues.
A. Vertical Leveraging, Market Power, and the Incentive To Discriminate
In its Net Neutrality Order, one of the principal reasons the FCC gave for
establishing prophylactic rules against the discrimination and blocking of
broadband traffic was the incentive and ability that broadband providers
possess to engage in these practices. 356 In doing so, the FCC expressly
addressed the conflicts that exist between online distributors such as Netflix
and the MVPD/broadband providers such as Comcast that serve as
thoroughfares for Netflix video traffic. 357 The Commission concluded that
the rise of services such as Netflix, Hulu, and others will put pressure on
broadband providers to act in anticompetitive ways against these services in
354. See Tessler, supra note 153 (noting an analyst’s opinion that the conditions
“shackle[] these new companies to traditional business models and inhibit[] innovation”).
355. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
356. See Net Neutrality Order, supra note 176, at 11.
357. Id. at 12–13 (arguing that “broadband providers have incentives to interfere with the
operation of third-party Internet-based services that compete with the providers’ revenuegenerating . . . pay-television services”); see also supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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order to make them less attractive to consumers.358 In adopting the
blocking and non-discrimination rule, the FCC sought to preemptively
curtail these acts, an effort that the Commission found necessary to promote
competition and innovation in broadband.359
From the standpoint of substantive necessity, the FCC’s assumptions
regarding broadband provider incentives and their competitive impact run
counter to developments in modern antitrust theory, which suggests that
exclusive vertical relationships are not necessarily harmful, and that they
often can lead to efficient, procompetitive results.360 In contrast to the
FCC’s asserted need for ex ante action to guarantee competition in the
market for broadband video distribution, modern antitrust analysis
approaches vertical arrangements from the presumption that they are
efficient. 361 The starting point for an assessment of how antitrust would
view exclusionary, vertical relationships in broadband video markets is the
architecture of the Internet, which can be broken into four distinct layers:
(1) content; (2) applications; (3) the logical layer, comprised of the standard
TCP/IP protocol used to transfer data over Internet networks; and (4) the
physical layer, composed of the transport facilities used to send data
through the Internet. 362 A key feature of this architecture is that the logical
layer is not controlled by anyone, and is open to content and application
developers without restriction.363 As a result, although broadband
providers exercise a high degree of control over the physical layer, because
the physical layer and the applications layer are distinct, application
developers are free to create various programs, such as Netflix and Hulu,
that use the standardized logic of the Internet to deliver content to
consumers without authorization or payment to broadband providers. 364
Although it would appear at first that broadband providers would be
chagrined by their inability to reap rewards from the transfer of unaffiliated
content over their networks, modern antitrust analysis suggests that
broadband providers are instead incentivized to encourage a robust
marketplace for applications and content because this increases the value of
the platform, allowing broadband providers to charge consumers a higher

358. Net Neutrality Order, supra note 176, at 13–14.
359. Id. at 45–46.
360. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, What Can Antitrust Contribute to the Network
Neutrality Debate?, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 493, 504–06 (2007).
361. Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 87 (2003) (“[C]urrent antitrust doctrine still generally presumes that
vertical agreements, vertical extension, and vertical mergers are unobjectionable unless a
fact-intensive investigation shows otherwise.”).
362. Id. at 90–91.
363. See id. (describing the impact of TCP/IP openness).
364. Id.; see also Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate,
59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575, 581–82 (2007) (relaying comments from network neutrality
proponent Tim Wu that the layered architecture promotes market entry by content and
application providers).
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price for broadband access. 365 In addition, this analysis contends that
platform providers are incentivized to make the most efficient decision as to
whether to join the applications market—a decision being made by
Comcast and other MVPDs with the TV Everywhere model 366—and will
do so only if it increases the overall value of the combined application and
platform. 367 Generally, a broadband provider is therefore encouraged to
provide support for the unaffiliated applications running over its physical
layer, so that it can maximize the value of its own platform. 368 The
presumption supported by this reasoning is that, where a platform
monopolist enters into the applications market, or if it engages in
exclusionary behavior within the applications market, it has done so only
because it is efficient and likely to benefit consumers. 369
This presumption lends support to those favoring a hands-off approach to
the rising conflict between broadband providers and online distributors,
insofar as the broadband provider will lack the incentive to inefficiently
block or degrade applications because it would result in a decrease in value
to consumers of its platform product. 370 However, there are several
pertinent exceptions to the above analysis.371 The most critical for the
broadband video marketplace is that, where the unaffiliated product at the
applications layer threatens a core business of the platform provider, the
platform provider might be incentivized to act inefficiently to suppress
those applications. 372 This is precisely the circumstance present in the
broadband video marketplace—as they grow, broadband video distributors
are becoming direct threats to broadband providers’ core MVPD
business. 373
Despite the likelihood that many broadband providers possess an
underlying incentive to engage in discriminatory conduct toward online
video distributors, that fact does not necessarily end the debate as to the
need for the FCC’s prophylactic remedy, because incentive alone is
365. Farrell & Weiser, supra note 361, at 103 (providing models as to how a platform
provider would benefit from unaffiliated application development).
366. See supra Part I.C.5.
367. Farrell & Weiser, supra note 361, at 103 (demonstrating how a platform provider’s
entry into the application market would be efficient and value-enhancing).
368. Id. at 104.
369. See id. at 104–05.
370. See Nuechterlein, supra note 171, at 41 (suggesting that, generally, platform
providers will not favor affiliated content in ways that harm consumers).
371. See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 361, at 105 (listing eight exceptions to the
presumption that platform providers will enter the applications market only if it is efficient).
372. Id. at 109 & n.100 (“[C]onsider the attitude of cable providers toward streaming
video applications over their cable modems. . . . [C]able providers should happily endorse
this use of their platform, as it would make the platform more valuable to users and therefore
more profitable. But a cable provider who allows video streaming will find it harder to
engage in the profitable and customary price discrimination that sets high markups for
premium cable programming. Thus, a cable provider might rationally, but inefficiently, try
to stop this innovative method of distribution.”); see also van Schewick, supra note 171, at
345–46 (drawing a similar analogy to a telephone company’s incentives with respect to a
VoIP service running over its broadband network).
373. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
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insufficient to exact competitive harm. Instead, there generally needs to be
a finding that the broadband provider possesses market power 374 and an
ability to engage in anticompetitive practices.375
One of the arguments against a determination that broadband providers
possess market power and the ability to exert anticompetitive leveraging
against broadband video distributors is grounded in the geographical scope
of various Internet-related markets. 376 Broadband providers, even if they
exist as a monopoly with respect to end users, can only engage in
anticompetitive practices against an online distributor in the specified local
area where they control the physical layer.377 Accordingly, even a large
broadband provider such as Comcast would be able to harm Netflix only in
a specified region, allowing Netflix to continue to reach customers in the
rest of the country. 378
In response to the above argument, those favoring the types of
prophylactic rules that the FCC adopted in the Net Neutrality Order argue
that the incentive and ability to engage in anticompetitive practices can be
found in a broadband provider’s power to protect their core business
without being injured by the exclusionary remedy of having to lose the
customer. 379 Moreover, this line of argument suggests that, even assuming
that the geographic market for content and applications is national, a
reduction of that market by a broadband provider would lead to a decreased
incentive to create innovative concepts at the application and content levels,
which is itself worthy of protection.380
A further divide between proponents and opponents of prophylactic rules
concerns the appropriate scope of competition policy. Under antitrust
principles, the goal of economic policy is to promote competition, without
374. See Howard A. Shelanski, Antitrust Law as Mass Media Regulation: Can Merger
Standards Protect the Public Interest?, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 371, 409 (2006) (defining “market
power” as a firm’s “ability to raise prices, lower output levels, reduce quality, or otherwise
indicate that it is insulated from competitive pressure”).
375. See Nuechterlein, supra note 171, at 34, 40; see generally James B. Speta, A
Sensible Next Step on Network Neutrality: The Market Power Question, 8 REV. NETWORK
ECON. 113 (2009). In its Net Neutrality Order, the FCC decided that it was unnecessary to
determine whether broadband providers hold market power based on the fact that broadband
providers possess the technical capability to block traffic in the last mile to end users. See
Net Neutrality Order, supra note 176, at 19 & n.87.
376. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 360, at 513.
377. See Nuechterlein, supra note 171, at 40 (“[N]o broadband provider occupies a large
enough share of the national broadband market to harm competition in the inherently
national (and international) markets for content and applications.”).
378. See Yoo, supra note 360, at 513 (arguing that content and application providers are
more concerned with the overall size of the applicable market than with their ability to reach
consumers in a specified local area). Yoo concludes that the broadband provider market,
measured against the national market for content and applications, is insufficiently
concentrated for one firm to threaten application and content providers. Id.
379. See Brett M. Frischmann and Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the
Economics of an Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS J.
383, 417–18 (2007) (arguing that, because broadband services usually operate as a monopoly
or duopoly in a given area, consumers are unlikely to switch services simply based on harm
to one applications provider).
380. See id. at 418–20.
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concerning itself with the impact that policies have on any one
competitor. 381 In the broadband context, those favoring this approach
assert that innovation occurs both at the content and applications level and
at the physical level of the network, and that, in the absence of harmful
conduct, such developments should be allowed to proceed outside of
regulation that might stifle experimentation and diversified broadband
practices. 382 The FCC diverged starkly from this perspective in the Net
Neutrality Order, expressly advocating for a regulatory framework that
protects innovation at the content and application layer even where
broadband provider activity does not amount to anticompetitive harm.383
The institutional decision in this regard may thus prove crucial, as it is
unclear whether, given these developments in modern antitrust doctrine, the
DOJ or the FTC would object to the blocking and discrimination practices
that lie at the center of the Net Neutrality Order.384
B. Beyond Economics: Public Interest Concerns and Broadband
Even as the debate rages over the appropriate economic approach to
broadband practices, others question whether competition should be the
primary concern in governing the relationships between broadband
providers and application and content providers. This section highlights
debates regarding the applicability of non-economic concerns in the
broadband context, and discusses recent FCC history in addressing these
concerns in the context of media ownership regulations and program access
rules.
1. The FCC’s Public Interest Standard
As a general rule, antitrust law’s sole focus is on competition, whereas
the FCC has a broader mandate to ensure that communications are delivered
in the “public interest,” an inquiry that encapsulates matters such as the
promotion of diversity and localism, as well as competition.385
Commentators diverge as to whether these non-competitive issues are
animated in broadband markets. Some have suggested that concerns related
to vertical leveraging against content and application providers are solely
within the ambit of the market power analysis that antitrust addresses.386
381. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977);
Nuechterlein, supra note 171, at 41.
382. See Yoo, supra note 360, at 501, 502–04.
383. Net Neutrality Order, supra note 176, at 45–46.
384. See Brenner, supra note 346, at 61 & n.185 (noting that antitrust would not
necessarily find a competitive violation if a broadband provider were to block certain
programming or charge fees for prioritizing third party traffic).
385. See Jerry Brito & Jerry Ellig, A Tale of Two Commissions: Net Neutrality and
Regulatory Analysis, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 33–34 (2007) (describing the different
congressional mandates directed to the FTC and the FCC by their respective enabling
statutes).
386. See Nuechterlein, supra note 171, at 37–39 (suggesting that the core concern of
nondiscrimination is market power, and that network neutrality regulation does not address
concerns related to issues of “free expression”); Speta, supra note 375, at 123–24.
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Others reject the argument that market-based considerations are the only
issues concerning broadband. In perhaps the sharpest critique of an
economic-only approach, Professor Susan Crawford has argued that the
concern of most debates over blocking and discrimination of content is
misplaced, in that its sole focus is over the control of content delivery. 387
Crawford suggests instead that the push for nondiscrimination helps foster
diverse and unknown types of human interactions that occur over networks
governed by nondiscrimination principles.388 Professor Anthony Varona
has echoed this sentiment, suggesting that “calls for net neutrality should be
broadened to encompass not only competitive and antitrust considerations
but also the effects that commoditization of bit transport would have on
opportunities for noncommercial, local political and democratic
engagement online.” 389
Whether a federal oversight regime for broadband practices simply
should be focused on competitive harms or whether it should delve into
issues relating to the elements discussed above is only preliminary to the
question of which federal agency is appropriate. As indicated, the antitrust
authorities are almost entirely focused upon the competitive concerns of a
given transaction or activity, while the FCC often relies upon its use of the
“public interest” or the “public convenience” in mandating rules under the
Communications Act. 390 The notion of the “public interest” itself has come
under much scrutiny, with critics lambasting the FCC’s application of this
standard as vague or subject to political whim. 391 Others express concern
that, despite the public interest mandate in the Communications Act, the
FCC has shifted toward evaluating media industry practices solely from the
standpoint of competitive efficiency, to the exclusion of concerns regarding
localism and diversity. 392 For example, Professor Howard Shelanski
describes two different approaches to interpreting the “public interest” in
communications policy. 393 The first is an “efficiency model” concerned
solely with fostering a market that meets consumer demand. 394 The
second, the “democracy model,” seeks to promote a media landscape
populated with quality, diverse programming. 395 Shelanski suggests the
“efficiency model” now takes precedence at the FCC, but that the
387. See Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications Law, 55
UCLA L. REV. 359, 389–91 (2007).
388. Id. at 390, 403.
389. Anthony E. Varona, Toward a Broadband Public Interest Standard, 61 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1, 120 (2009).
390. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d) (2006).
391. See Barkow & Huber, supra note 333, at 42–43 (describing the “public interest” as
“amorphous” and stating that the FCC uses whatever standard it deems convenient at the
time of its rulemaking). But see Thomas M. Koutsky & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Separating
Politics From Policy in FCC Merger Reviews: A Basic Legal Primer of the “Public
Interest” Standard, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 329, 338 (2010) (arguing that the “public
interest” standard is delineated by applicable judicial precedent).
392. See Shelanski, supra note 374, at 388.
393. Id. at 383–87.
394. Id.
395. Id.
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“democracy model” is still raised with respect to media diversity concerns
and the promotion of particular programming. 396 While thus arguing that
the FCC has abandoned elements of the public interest in some instances,
Shelanski further asserts that an antitrust regime would be ill-suited to
fostering either the “democracy” or “efficiency” model in media
markets. 397
2. Media Ownership Rules and Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC
Among the FCC actions that might impact the Commission’s approach to
broadband regulation is its treatment of media ownership rules. 398 Over the
years, the FCC enacted a number of rules that have imposed restrictions
upon the number of media entities one organization can own on both a
national and local level.399 Beginning in the 1940s, these rules included
disallowing a firm from owning more than one television station in one
community, as well as a cap on the percentage of the national broadcast
audience that could be reached by stations that were under one firm’s
control. 400 Additionally, a rule imposed in the 1970s dictated that a single
company could not own a newspaper and a television station in the same
local community. 401 The motivation for these rules was the promotion of
local and diverse media programming in the name of the “public
interest.” 402
Media ownership regulation began to come under strain in the 1980s,
when deregulatory sentiments at the FCC led to efforts to eliminate the
nationwide ownership limitations. 403 Ultimately, Congress interceded in
proceedings that would have led to complete deregulation and in 1984
increased the authorized ownership level to twenty-five percent of the
national viewing audience. 404 The passage of the 1996 Act continued this
deregulatory pattern. There, Congress specifically directed the FCC to raise
396. Id. at 387–89.
397. Id. at 397, 402.
398. Cf. John Blevins, A Fragile Foundation—The Role of “Intermodal” and “FacilitiesBased” Competition in Communications Policy, 60 ALA. L. REV. 241, 249 (2009)
(suggesting that the deregulatory regimes for both broadband Internet service and media
ownership policies were influenced by the FCC’s belief that consumers had access to
competitive alternatives).
399. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 378–79.
400. See id.; see also Broadcast Services Other Than Standard Broadcast, 6 Fed. Reg.
2282, 2284–85 (May 6, 1941).
401. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 378; see also Amendment of
Sections 73.34, 73.240, & 73.636 of the Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of
Standard, FM, & Television Broad. Stations, 50 F.C.C. 2d 1046, 1047 (1975) [hereinafter
Multiple Ownership Rules] (2d rep. and order).
402. See, e.g., Multiple Ownership Rules, supra note 401, at 1048 (“Section 309(a) [of
the Communications Act] specifically requires the Commission to find that the granting of a
license serves the public interest, convenience, and necessity. The term public interest
encompasses many factors including ‘the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources.’” (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1,
20 (1945))).
403. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 378–79.
404. See id. at 379.
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the national ownership limit to thirty-five percent of the national viewing
audience. 405 Additionally, Section 202(h) of the 1996 Act directed the FCC
to conduct quadrennial reviews of its media ownership rules and, upon
review, to “repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in
the public interest.” 406 Pursuant to this mandate, in a 2003 order 407 (2003
Media Ownership Order), the Commission made substantial revisions to—
or repealed—a number of its ownership rules. 408 The FCC concluded that
the public interest could be served by increasing the national audience cap
to forty-five percent. 409 The Commission also made significant changes to
its cross-ownership rules, eliminating the rule entirely in large markets.410
The FCC relied upon a number of different factors as having obviated the
need for the rules, pointing to the rise of competitive cable stations and the
Internet as a source of diverse media voices in relaxing its requirements.411
In making these changes to its ownership rules, the FCC was acting not
simply based on the statutory language in section 202(h). Instead, the
deregulatory bent of the 2003 Media Ownership Order was partially
grounded in two decisions from the D.C. Circuit interpreting section 202(h).
In the first, Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 412 the D.C. Circuit held
that the language in 202(h) requiring the Commission to determine if its
media ownership rules were “necessary in the public interest” created “a
presumption in favor of repealing or modifying the ownership rules.”413
The Fox court rejected what it described as the FCC’s earlier “wait-andsee” approach to section 202(h) determinations where it had failed to justify
the continued implementation of the national ownership cap through a
sufficient evidentiary record. 414 The Fox decision served to remand the
review of the media ownership rules to the FCC, with a seemingly clear
directive that the FCC carried the burden of showing that the continued use

405. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(c)(1)(B), 110 Stat. 56,
111 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 303 note (2006) (Broadcast Ownership)).
406. Id. § 202(h). The 1996 Act initially required biennial review of the ownership rules,
but Congress amended this in 2004 to provide for quadrennial review. See Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99–100 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 303 note).
407. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Comm’n’s Broad. Ownership
Rules, 18 FCC Rcd. 13,620 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 Media Ownership Order].
408. See Shelanski, supra note 374, at 379–80; see also NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra
note 15, at 380.
409. 2003 Media Ownership Order, supra note 407, at 13,814–15. After public outrage
over the increase, Congress reduced the national viewership ownership limit to thirty-nine
percent. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 381.
410. 2003 Media Ownership Order, supra note 407, at 13,800–03; see also Shelanski,
supra note 374, at 380.
411. 2003 Media Ownership Order, supra note 407, at 13,623 (“Our current rules
inadequately account for the competitive presence of cable, ignore the diversity-enhancing
value of the Internet, and lack any sound basis for a national audience reach cap.”); see also
NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 381.
412. 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir.), modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
413. Id. at 1048.
414. Id. at 1044.
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of the extant media ownership rules remained “necessary in the public
interest.” 415
A second significant judicial antecedent to the FCC’s 2003 Media
Ownership Order was the D.C. Circuit’s 2002 decision in Sinclair
Broadcasting Group v. FCC. 416 In Sinclair, the court reviewed the FCC’s
decision to partially relax its local broadcast station ownership rules, which
had disallowed one entity from owning two separate broadcast stations in
the same geographic region. 417 In 1999, under the aegis of section 202(h),
the FCC had loosened this requirement for the first time, allowing a
company to own multiple broadcast stations in the same community so long
as eight independently owned television stations would remain in the
designated geographic region, and both stations were not ranked within the
top four broadcast stations in the locality. 418 In modifying this rule without
abolishing it, the Commission argued that it was seeking to balance its
interest in maintaining diversity in the broadcast arena with changes
wrought in recent years that had resulted in a variety of new media
entrants. 419 Sinclair Broadcasting brought a challenge to the revised limits,
arguing that the FCC was required to abolish the rule entirely. 420 While the
D.C. Circuit acknowledged that it normally gives strong deference to the
agency’s determination with respect to its belief of what is necessary to
foster diversity, the court found that the Commission had failed to offer
appropriate evidence as to why it excluded non-broadcast media outlets
from its eight independent station requirement.421 As in Fox, the Sinclair
court criticized the FCC for adopting a “‘wait-and-see approach’” with
respect to including non-broadcast outlets in its independent voices
count. 422 After review, the court remanded the local ownership limitations
to the Commission with a mandate to justify their continued existence with
a more complete evidentiary record.423
Fox and Sinclair thus served as motivation for the FCC’s deregulatory
approach toward review of the media ownership rules. 424 In the 2003
Media Ownership Order, the FCC expressly recognized that it was acting
under the presumptions and evidentiary requirements of Fox and Sinclair,
and acknowledged that those courts’ interpretations of section 202(h)
mandated that the burden rested upon those attempting to maintain the

415. Id.; see also Shelanski, supra note 374, at 378.
416. 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
417. Id. at 154–55.
418. Review of the Comm’n’s Regulations Governing Television Broad., 14 FCC Rcd.
12,903, 12,933 (1999) (rep. and order).
419. Id. at 12,904.
420. Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 152.
421. Id. at 161, 162–63.
422. Id. at 162–64 (quoting Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1042
(D.C. Cir. 2002)).
423. Id. at 169.
424. See Shelanski, supra note 374, at 379 (“[S]tatutory mandates, past FCC decisions,
and the courts played important roles in defining the scope and substance of the review and
in creating a complex set of pressures to deregulate.”).
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ownership rules. 425 This frame of reference influenced the FCC’s decision
to make the significant changes discussed above.426
The Commission’s actions in the 2003 Media Ownership Order prompted
a considerable backlash from those opposing further media deregulation.427
In addition to the direct response from Congress regarding the national
ownership cap, 428 the portions of the FCC’s order concerning local
ownership limitations were challenged in court.429 In 2004, the Third
Circuit invalidated much of the 2003 Media Ownership Order in
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC. 430 In doing so, the Third Circuit
acknowledged that the FCC had the ability to modify or repeal its
ownership rules under section 202(h), but concluded that the Commission
had once again failed to provide a comprehensive evidentiary record
supporting its determinations that maintaining the rules was no longer in the
public interest. 431
First, the Prometheus court rejected the section 202(h) readings of Fox
and Sinclair, concluding instead that section 202(h) provides no statutory
presumption in favor of eliminating the rules.432 With respect to the
Commission’s decision to relax the rule barring ownership of both a
newspaper and television station in the same geographic market, the Third
Circuit took issue with the “diversity index” that the FCC had developed as
a way of measuring whether cross-ownership would allow for a significant
number of diverse news sources within a locality. 433 In particular, the court
determined that the FCC had overvalued the Internet as a source for local
media content, and that the FCC irrationally did this in light of the
Commission’s decision to exclude cable news sources from the diversity
calculus. 434 The court additionally chastised the Commission for assigning
equal market shares in its diversity index to each of the firms within a
certain medium, even though the FCC had assigned different diversity
values to distinct media. 435 Finally, the court concluded that the new crossownership regime set up in the 2003 Media Ownership Order had been
inconsistently derived from the formula that the FCC had developed using
the diversity index.436 The result of Prometheus was a remand of the crossownership rules to the FCC, with an admonishment to provide better
evidentiary support for its rulemaking. 437 The 2003 Media Ownership
Order’s loosening of the bar on a company’s ability to own multiple
425. 2003 Media Ownership Order, supra note 407, at 13,624–25, 13,722.
426. See supra notes 407–11 and accompanying text.
427. See, e.g., NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 380–82; Shelanski, supra note
374, at 381.
428. See supra note 409 and accompanying text.
429. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004).
430. Id. at 435.
431. Id. at 382.
432. Id. at 393–94; see also NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 382 & n.96.
433. Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 403–04.
434. Id. at 405–06.
435. Id. at 408–09.
436. Id. at 411.
437. Id. at 408–09, 411–12.
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television stations within the same geographic region met a similar fate, as
the Prometheus court remanded the rule to the FCC on the grounds that it
had failed to justify why it had chosen the specific regime it adopted.438
The FCC, pursuant to the section 202(h) directive, took up the
Prometheus remand in its next quadrennial review of the media ownership
rules. 439 There, the FCC determined that many of the extant ownership
rules remained necessary in the public interest.440 It decided to alter only
one rule, allowing an owner of a broadcast television station to also own a
newspaper in the same community but only in the largest markets, and
subject to the requirements that (1) the station cannot be in the top four
stations in the market, and (2) there must still be eight independent “major
media voices” in the particular market. 441 That determination is currently
being challenged before the Third Circuit. 442
The result of the strange path from the 1996 Act’s mandate in section
202(h) to review of the ownership rules through Fox, Sinclair, and
Prometheus is that the media ownership rules have barely changed. From
the standpoint of the development of broadband video distribution, which
itself casts a new shadow over the question of media control, the media
ownership proceedings show what can happen when an agency attempts to
tackle issues beyond the question of competition policy. 443
3. Program Access Rules
Program access rules are another component of FCC media regulation
that relate to the concerns raised in the broadband video market. Pursuant
to the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992 444 (Cable Act), cable providers are required to make satellitedelivered programming that they own or control available to rival MVPD
services at reasonable rates. 445 This rule functions to bar MVPDs from
carrying popular programming exclusively through their own MVPD
services, which would arguably make their services more attractive to
consumers and perpetuate their market dominance.446 Like the media
ownership rules, the program access rules have had a contentious
procedural history at the FCC. When Congress initially established the
438. Id. at 418–20.
439. See 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Comm’n’s Broad.
Ownership Rules & Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms. Act of
1996, 23 FCC Rcd. 2010 (2007) (rep. and order and order on reconsideration).
440. Id. at 2016–17 (noting that, while the media landscape was undergoing changes,
most consumers continued to rely on traditional media sources such as broadcast television
and newspapers for their local news and information sources).
441. Id. at 2019.
442. See, e.g., Katy Bachman, Media Ownership Rules in Limbo, MEDIA ACCESS PROJECT
(Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.mediaaccess.org/2011/02/media-ownership-rules-in-limbo/.
443. See Shelanski, supra note 374, at 381 (suggesting that ownership changes that result
in a loss of diverse viewpoints leads to more public outcry than ownership changes where
the result is only pecuniary).
444. Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 19, 106 Stat. 1460, 1494 (1992).
445. 47 U.S.C. § 548 (2006).
446. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 369–70.
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program access rules in 1992, the Cable Act provided that the rules would
sunset after ten years unless the FCC affirmatively found them to still be
necessary to promote competition and diversity in video programming
distribution. 447 The FCC, upon review in 2002, extended the rules through
October 2007, 448 and then again extended them until October 2012,449 in
each instance contending that the continuance of the rules was necessary for
a competitive and diverse MVPD marketplace.450 In addition, in 2010, the
FCC extended the reach of the program access rules to bar exclusive
arrangements for programming that is delivered terrestrially. 451 The last
order was passed over the dissent of Commissioner McDowell, who argued
that the FCC had no authority to extend the rules to terrestrial distribution
given the Cable Act’s express reference to satellite-delivered
programming. 452
The continued existence and scope of the program access rules are likely
to be critical in the broadband video distribution market. As discussed
above, the FCC and DOJ imposed upon Comcast requirements that it make
NBCU content available to broadband competitors.453 There are many
issues surrounding this potential requirement, including how the FCC
would go about determining which online distributors would qualify as
rival MVPDs and thus have access to NBCU content. 454 However, because
an important component of Comcast’s decision to acquire NBCU was likely
to buttress its TV Everywhere online model against other online
competitors, the imposition of program access rules could effectively
eliminate the vertical efficiencies of the merger, 455 and might also impose a
MVPD-type model on the developing broadband space. 456
C. Questions of Procedure: Finding an Optimal Approach to Broadband
Oversight
Apart from the substantive considerations addressed above,
commentators have debated whether antitrust law or FCC regulation
provides the best procedural mechanism to address concerns in a dynamic
broadband landscape. The issue of whether broadband video concerns
should be handled through FCC regulation or antitrust oversight presents a
447. 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(5).
448. See Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection & Competition
Act of 1992, 17 FCC Rcd. 12,124, 12,124 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 Cable Implementation]
(rep. and order).
449. See Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection & Competition
Act of 1992, 22 FCC Rcd. 17,791, 17,792 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 Cable Implementation]
(rep. and order and notice of proposed rulemaking).
450. See 2002 Cable Implementation, supra note 448, at 12,125; 2007 Cable
Implementation, supra note 449, at 17,792.
451. See Review of the Comm’n’s Program Access Rules & Examination of
Programming Tying Arrangements, 25 FCC Rcd. 746, 747 (2010) (1st rep. and order).
452. Id. at 822 (McDowell, Comm’r, dissenting).
453. See supra note 349 and accompanying text.
454. See Peers, supra note 144.
455. See id.
456. See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
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challenge of balancing the institutional merits of each agency. 457 In
general, outside of the merger review context, the antitrust approach to
competition oversight is straightforward: the DOJ and FTC enforce the
antitrust laws on a case-by-case basis, building evidence after a violation
arises. 458 Conversely, the FCC often conducts its regulatory oversight
through ex ante rulemaking. 459 However, in the 2009 NPRM, the FCC
sought comment on whether its oversight of broadband practices should
proceed through case-by-case determinations. 460 Moreover, the FCC’s Net
Neutrality Order appears to have embraced the notion of a case-by-case
adjudication methodology, at least with respect to determining when a
broadband provider’s actions constitute “reasonable network
management.” 461
Either an FCC or antitrust regime would likely face procedural
drawbacks when engaging the dynamic broadband video landscape. The
FCC in particular is often criticized for a lack of a proper evidentiary record
in its rulemaking proceedings. 462 The Fox, Sinclair, and Prometheus cases
demonstrate the extent to which judges find failings in the FCC’s ordermaking process: courts in those cases were consistently critical of the
FCC’s failure to produce a robust and logical evidentiary record to support
the Commission’s decisions. 463 Evidentiary concerns were also addressed
in the Net Neutrality Order by Commissioner Meredith Attwell Baker who,
in dissent, roundly criticized the majority’s decision to promulgate broad
rules despite a lack of evidence of anticompetitive broadband practices.464
These types of critiques have frequently been raised against the
Commission; 465 some observers view the institutional paradigm as running
457. See Weiser, supra note 301, at 318 (“[T]he most nettlesome policy challenge is to
develop and implement an effective institutional framework to enforce any system of
managing the competition policy issues associated with overseeing the terms of dealing
between applications providers and network owners.”).
458. See Weiss & Stern, supra note 282, at 195; see also Barkow & Huber, supra note
333, at 37 (suggesting that the role of the DOJ is “to interfere only as is necessary to keep
markets free and competitive”).
459. See Weiss & Stern, supra note 281, at 195.
460. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
461. Net Neutrality Order, supra note 176, at 48; see also supra note 267 and
accompanying text.
462. See Shelanski, supra note 374, at 418–19 (describing the evidentiary support that
courts reviewing the FCC’s media ownership decisions require); Speta, supra note 375, at
117 (suggesting that the FCC’s Comcast decision was made with “very little in the way of
rigorous fact-finding”).
463. See supra notes 414, 421, 431 and accompanying text.
464. Net Neutrality Order, supra note 176, at 182–83 (Baker, Comm’r, dissenting)
(noting that the majority opinion uses the word “could” over sixty times in providing support
for the need to police broadband practices). The Net Neutrality Order lists only four
concrete examples of violations of its open internet policies: (1) the Madison River consent
decree, (2) the Comcast/BitTorrent dispute, (3) an example of an exclusionary contract
between a wireless company and a payment service company, and (4) an example of a
mobile provider restricting access to applications on its wireless network. Id. at 21 & nn.
104–05.
465. See, e.g., Speta, supra note 309, at 129 (suggesting that the FCC’s “behavior,
historically and especially recently, has ranged from impeding competition to the simply
bizarre”); see also supra note 391 and accompanying text.
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so deep that they suggest that, in a broadband world, the FCC must adopt
policies akin to the way antitrust authorities handle claims in order to
provide effective oversight. 466
Despite the seeming preferred status that antitrust has assumed as an
institutional body, even those who favor an antitrust-like approach to
broadband oversight have recognized a variety of shortcomings in the
procedural approaches that the DOJ and the FTC must follow in enforcing
antitrust law. The first of these concerns is that the antitrust agencies’
reliance on the court system for enforcement can lead to problematic delays
in resolving issues in a developing marketplace. 467 Moreover, for private
parties, antitrust can represent an extremely costly enforcement measure. 468
The second issue that leads commentators to question the institutional
efficacy of antitrust is the contention that the DOJ and the FTC lack the
necessary expertise to handle complex issues related to broadband and
telecommunications policy. As an agency dedicated to communications
policy, the FCC is presumed to possess a level of experience and industry
expertise that allows it to best address broadband concerns.469 However,
others downplay this assessment, arguing that the FCC is no more capable
of addressing market ills in the broadband sector than antitrust
authorities.470
IV. A DEREGULATORY POSTURE FOR A DEVELOPING MARKET
The rise of broadband video is beginning to affect the media landscape
dramatically, as the convergence of media distribution to broadband
networks rearranges the relationships between consumers, content creators,
and distributors. 471 Among the changes being wrought are agreements

466. See, e.g., Weiser, supra note 301, at 318 (“As commentators increasingly emphasize,
the future of telecommunications regulation is for the FCC to reorient its mission to
evaluating conduct after the fact using antitrust-like standards.”).
467. See Brenner, supra note 346, at 62 & n.189 (suggesting that antitrust presents a
“good way” to conceptualize broadband policy concerns, but that it is lacking as an
institution equipped to achieve timely remedy); Speta, supra note 290, at 19 (suggesting that
antitrust reliance on case-by-case adjudication leads to “delay and nonuniformity” of
results). But see Net Neutrality Order, supra note 176, at 152 (McDowell, Comm’r,
dissenting) (arguing that the network neutrality rules adopted by the FCC are unnecessary
because “[i]f market failure were to occur . . . America’s antitrust and consumer protection
laws stand at the ready. Both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
are well equipped to cure any market ills.”).
468. See Blevins, supra note 398, at 286.
469. See, e.g., Koutsky & Spiwak, supra note 391, at 332–33 (discussing, in the context
of dual merger review, that “the antitrust enforcement agencies simply may not have the
industry expertise to understand all of the complexities and nuances of the telecom
business”); Speta, supra note 309, at 130 (suggesting that the FCC should be charged with
policing net neutrality concerns, in part because of “institutional expertise” and
“experience”).
470. See Nuechterlein, supra note 171, at 61–62 (arguing that the need for the FCC’s
technical expertise is overstated); see generally Brenner, supra note 346, at 48–54
(discussing instances where the FCC failed to acknowledge or comprehend technical
considerations that should have impacted its regulatory decisions).
471. See supra notes 64–70 and accompanying text.
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between media participants that integrate content and distribution channels
in an effort to gain dominance in this emerging marketplace.472 These
arrangements and the nature of this market have led to rising tensions in the
broadband video marketplace, and create the potential that traditional
distributors will be incentivized to take anticompetitive action against the
new entrants. 473 As this marketplace has gained prominence and these
conflicts have become increasingly apparent, federal authorities have begun
to assess the need for regulatory intervention to prevent market harm.474
The FCC reacted to these possible conflicts by promulgating rules that
purport to prevent broadband providers from discriminating against online
distributors, 475 despite a significant judicial defeat with respect to its
authority over broadband practices.476
This part contends that, absent congressional action, the FCC lacks the
jurisdictional authority to mount an effective oversight regime over
broadband practices. Moreover, this part argues that, even assuming that
the Commission is able to overcome these jurisdictional deficiencies, the
current regime of prophylactic rules promulgated by the FCC is an
inappropriate method of regulation for the broadband video market.
Instead, this part proposes that, absent systemic market harms, oversight of
this developing marketplace should be left to the antitrust authorities.
A. The FCC’s Cloudy Jurisdictional Picture
Following Comcast, the first question to ask regarding government
oversight of broadband video distribution is whether the FCC possesses
jurisdiction over this developing marketplace. This issue remains relevant
because the Commission continues to assert its authority over broadband
practices, despite its defeat in the D.C. Circuit.477 As a result, the FCC
faces continuing legal and political attacks that challenge its authority in
this arena. 478 The Commission may yet survive the political turmoil
surrounding its recent actions, 479 but its position as to its legal authority to
regulate broadband practices should be rejected.
Drawing upon the Title I ancillary authority delineated by the Supreme
Court in Southwestern Cable, Midwest I, and Midwest II, 480 the FCC has
tethered its broadband regulatory efforts to Communications Act provisions
that either espouse congressional policy, or that demarcate the
Commission’s express authority to regulate common carriers, broadcasting,
and cable services. 481 Indeed, broadband has become a critical component
472. See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text.
473. See supra notes 70, 372–73 and accompanying text.
474. See supra notes 144–47, 305–08 and accompanying text.
475. See supra notes 263–70 and accompanying text.
476. See supra notes 247–48 and accompanying text.
477. See supra notes 260–72 and accompanying text.
478. See supra notes 274–81 and accompanying text.
479. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
480. See supra notes 188–97 and accompanying text.
481. See supra note 271 and accompanying text; see also Net Neutrality Order, supra
note 176, at 63 (“[O]ur adoption of basic rules of the road for broadband providers
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of the communications system, and the FCC has received congressional
indications of the need for Commission involvement in broadband
expansion. 482 But as presently formulated, the FCC’s efforts to regulate
broadband practice strain the bounds of the Supreme Court’s ancillary
jurisdiction doctrine and disregard a procedural mandate of the D.C.
Circuit’s decision in Comcast. Beginning with Southwestern Cable, the
Supreme Court’s ancillary jurisdiction cases promulgated a rule that gives
the FCC flexibility to take action where doing so is necessary to enforce the
substantive provisions of the Communications Act. 483 But this jurisdiction
is not unfettered: the FCC’s Title I authority exists only as a limited grant
and, as interpreted by the Comcast court, requires the FCC to defend its
exercise on a case-by-case basis. 484 However, instead of proceeding
against concrete instances of harms, the FCC’s latest effort to regulate
broadband in the Net Neutrality Order seeks to enforce “prophylactic” rules
over Internet practice.485 The Net Neutrality Order amounts to a patchwork
of provisions sewn together to provide the Commission with Title I
authority over the entire broadband sector. 486 It is difficult to square the
breadth of this assertion of authority with the particularized regulatory
interventions that led the Supreme Court to recognize the development of
the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine.487 Moreover, the Commission is
promulgating its rules in the face of hypothetical harms, 488 further
suggesting that it has failed to show how its regulation of broadband is
“‘reasonably ancillary to the . . . effective performance of its statutorily
mandated responsibilities.’” 489
Additionally, there are pragmatic concerns regarding the Commission’s
ability to effectuate a governance regime under Title I. Because the
Commission lacks express authority over the Internet, 490 it must shoehorn
its regulation of broadband practices to the express authority given to it
under the substantive provisions of the Communications Act. 491 But the
developments of the past decade—principally those resulting from the
implements specific statutory mandates in the Communications Act and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.”).
482. See supra notes 2–4, 31–32 and accompanying text.
483. See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text.
484. See supra notes 197, 256 and accompanying text.
485. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
486. See supra notes 265–67, 271 and accompanying text.
487. See supra notes 188–97 and accompanying text. Concurring with the plurality in
Midwest I that the FCC could exercise its Title I jurisdiction to force cable systems to create
original programming, Chief Justice Warren Burger expressed his reservations regarding
further non-statutory expansion of the Commission’s authority. See United States v. Midwest
Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 676 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“Candor requires
acknowledgment, for me at least, that the Commission’s position strains the outer limits of
even the open-ended and pervasive jurisdiction that has evolved by decisions of the
Commission and the courts.”).
488. See supra note 464 and accompanying text.
489. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (alteration in original)
(quoting Am. Library Ass’n. v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
490. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
491. See supra notes 180–83, 191–92 and accompanying text.
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spread of broadband—demonstrate that the services regulated in Titles II,
III, and VI of the Communications Act are themselves undergoing
considerable change. Under a Title I structure where the Commission must
separately justify each use of its ancillary authority, the FCC may be
confronted with a need to constantly reevaluate its posture toward
broadband against the moving target of the broader communications
system. 492 There are reasons to doubt the Commission’s ability to adapt
properly to such volatile regulatory circumstances. For example, the
discussion regarding media ownership rules demonstrates how the
Commission, even when presented with a directive from Congress, has
struggled to convince reviewing courts that it is properly adapting its
rulemaking to changed circumstances. 493 More general critiques of FCC
methodology further suggest that, as an institution, the Commission may be
unable to maintain an effective oversight regime over broadband in the
absence of express statutory directive. 494
The form of sweeping prophylactic measures that the FCC has taken in
the Net Neutrality Order may not be the most effective way for the
Commission to address structural concerns in the marketplace for
broadband video distribution.
The Commission’s jurisdiction over
telecommunications and media mergers, while often criticized, remains
unquestioned. 495 In its recent review of the Comcast/NBCU merger, the
FCC demonstrated the extent to which this authority can be utilized to
extract conditions from major players in the broadband video
marketplace. 496 Putting aside the merits of the conditions, the terms that
the joint FCC and DOJ effort was able to obtain from the merged entity
substantially address many of the conflicts raised in the broadband video
marketplace. 497 These terms suggest that the Commission may be best
served by reserving its efforts to those instances where a specific
transaction raises considerable competitive concerns.
B. Beyond Jurisdiction: The Need for Regulation
Even if the FCC can overcome the jurisdictional obstacles it faces in
erecting an enforceable regulatory regime under its ancillary authority, the
Commission’s current approach to overseeing the market for broadband
video distribution should be rejected in favor of a hands-off, antitrust-led
regime. Within this developing marketplace, despite the potential for
anticompetitive harm, there have as yet been no instances that exclaim the
need for continued regulatory oversight. 498 Indeed, examples where
supposed antagonistic parties have made distribution arrangements in this
developing space belie the Commission’s insistence that preemptive
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.

See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 406, 408, 414, 421–22, 431 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 462–66 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 329–35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 348–54 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 143–48 and accompanying text.
See supra note 464 and accompanying text.
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regulation is necessary to protect online distributors from discriminatory
actions. 499 Even where tensions have flared, this should not give rise
immediately to concerns about systematic anticompetitive practices.
Instead, the problems in cases such as the Comcast-Level 3 dispute500
simply should be seen as inevitable business disputes between network
participants as they respond to significant changes to market structure. At
most, such instances raise cause for concern, but are insufficient to provide
the basis to enact broad, prophylactic rules. Given that the broadband video
market is in its infancy, regulators should be wary of taking action without
a clear finding of market harm. 501
The FCC’s actions are also problematic because of their substantive
impact on the broadband video marketplace. The FCC’s prophylactic
adoption of non-blocking and non-discrimination rules forecloses
stakeholders in the broadband distribution market from entering into
agreements that may produce beneficial results.502 At present, the growth
of broadband distribution is undermining many of the traditional revenue
streams in the media distribution business.503 In the FCC’s push to regulate
the relationship between online distributors and broadband providers, the
forgotten component of this system seems to be content producers, who
have complex affiliations with both sides of this emerging conflict. 504 It
seems likely that content providers, in an effort to sustain revenue models
that are collapsing in the broadband era, 505 will encourage experimentation
in distribution systems at both the application level and the network
level. 506 This necessity commands a flexible approach to market remedy
that promotes innovation at all levels, and that intervenes only where
market harm is clearly delineated.507
It may seem odd to reject FCC intervention in the broadband video
marketplace. After all, the broadband distribution of video is linked closely
to other areas of communications policy where the FCC has had plenary
Moreover, Congress has directed the
jurisdiction since 1934. 508
Commission to promote the adoption of broadband services in the United
States. 509 However, it remains to be seen whether the rationales previously
used to justify FCC entry into communications markets are applicable here.
The companies involved in this market, far from being small, independent
entities in need of regulatory oversight for survival, are often major
corporations in retailing, equipment manufacturing, and digital
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500.
501.
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See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 306–07 and accompanying text.
See supra note 382 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 381–83 and accompanying text.
See supra note 382 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 178–79 and accompanying text.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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distribution. 510 In addition, it is unclear whether the public interest
concerns that have spawned much of the FCC’s entry into media markets
through the media ownership rules and program access rules are present in a
distribution market that is unmoored from the geographical limitations and
physical scarcity that prompt calls for diversity and localism. 511 Instead,
the concerns in the present marketplace for broadband video distribution are
focused almost entirely on the need for robust competition. Viewed
through this competitive prism, it is difficult to argue that consumers are not
benefitting from present market conditions. A variety of competitive,
inexpensive means for viewing professional video content have developed
under the deregulated status quo.512
Under present circumstances, a regime governed by antitrust should
replace the FCC’s prophylactic rules. Instead of rushing to impose rules on
market activities, the developments in broadband video distribution should
be viewed under modern antitrust law.513 Although there may be some
concerns with the efficacy of continued antitrust oversight of the
communications sector, 514 the FCC’s jurisdictional uncertainty is equally
problematic. Moreover, the dynamism of the broadband video marketplace
should allay concerns regarding antitrust oversight. Because the current
marketplace for broadband video distribution is not plagued by entrenched
dominant players or systematic market failure, it is not one in need of
ongoing oversight and frequent intervention. Instead, it is a marketplace of
constant evolution; the developing concerns over anticompetitive acts
should be viewed in light of the complexities of the market and as the
byproduct of fundamental changes to the way film and television are
delivered to consumers. These circumstances demand not a rigid regulatory
hand, but rather the looser approach of antitrust-as-backstop, with
intervention only in the specific instances where it proves necessary to
protect consumer interests.
The broadband video market may eventually manifest anticompetitive
practices that require considerable regulatory involvement. If that occurs,
FCC oversight may be appropriate. Until then, the FCC should resist the
urge to be a “cop on the beat,” 515 and allow the broadband video
distribution market to police itself.
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